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I. INTRODUCTION   
In the documentary film Restrepo, the camera focuses on a young Army captain, 
the commander of the garrison at Outpost (OP) Restrepo, seated in a village shura 
alongside a host of wizened Afghan elders in the summer of 2006.  Speaking through an 
interpreter, the captain informs the elders of the prospects for a new road into the 
Korengal Valley that will economically connect their village to the rest of Afghanistan.  
The conversation quickly veers to the elders‘ concern for several younger villagers that 
had been taken into custody and sent to Bagram for questioning.   The meeting quickly 
stalls, and the frustration is evident on the captain‘s face.   The company‘s Sergeant 
Major sums up the exchange after the fact:   
The thing that‘s sad to me is that as much as [the captain] would go down 
there and conduct different shuras and tell them about the positives [of] 
what we can do to help them… it seemed like it didn‘t go anywhere.  It 
seemed like we took one step forward, and they took two steps backward.1 
Coalition forces were never able to win over the population of the Korengal 
valley.  Four years later, in the spring of 2010, a picture in the Washington Post showed a 
beaming Shahmshir Khan, the same elder who had questioned OP Restrepo‘s commander 
on the fate of the villagers in his charge, clasping hands with the current commander as 
the American soldiers prepared to abandon their positions in the Korengal.2 
United States forces have not been the first foreigners to be confounded by 
Afghan unpredictability.  In 1897, the British in India were caught flat-footed when a 
mujahideen army coalesced seemingly overnight and attacked British positions in that 
valley, nearly capturing a British garrison at Chakdara.  For many months before, reports 
had generally reflected improved relations between the British administration and the 
local Pashtuns.  But a local preacher, whom the British would later refer to as the ―Mad 
                                                 
1 Sebastian Junger and Tim Hetherington, Restrepo, Documentary (Outpost Films in association with 
National Geographic, 2010), pt. 40:25. 
2 Greg Jaffe, ―U.S. retreat from Afghan valley marks recognition of blunder,‖ Washington Post, April 
15, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/14/AR2010041401012.html. 
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Fakir of Swat‖ for his claims to be able to turn the enemy‘s bullets into water, united 
thousands of factional tribesmen under a banner of jihad.3 
In today‘s counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan, many newly-trained Afghan 
security forces find themselves battling so-called Taliban forces that only a few weeks 
before had been aligned with government-supported arbakai4 militias.  A recent news 
journal article described an arbakai commander who, within the space of a few weeks, 
had robbed a local bank, joined the Taliban to avoid prosecution, then switched 
allegiances back to the government just before a coalition offensive in the area, expecting 
that his ―slate would be wiped clean.‖5  
In addition to direct security efforts, the U.S. lead International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) has embarked on many nation-building and Afghan governance 
development efforts, often resulting in programs that are, if not inefficient, outright 
corrupt.  The recent poppy eradication efforts in southern Afghanistan are a case in point, 
with many regional government officials pursuing poppy eradication with relish in order 
to push up the market values of their own opium production farms.6     
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The anecdotes above reflect some of the most basic challenges that 
counterinsurgent forces face every day in Afghanistan.  Rural Afghans continue to make 
decisions about their security and allegiances based on a seemingly unpredictable logic.  
This logic often seems irrational and incomprehensible to Coalition forces, especially in 
light of intense efforts to secure the loyalty of the population through increased focus on 
what has become known as ―population-centric‖ counterinsurgency.  
                                                 
3 David B. Edwards, Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1996), 172–177. 
4 Arbakai are traditional tribal defense forces organized ad hoc to defend the village from a threat. 
5 Paul Wood, ―A Battle in Baghlan,‖ Foreign Policy, March 11, 2011, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/11/my_embed_with_a_warlord. 
6 Justin Mankin, ―Rotten to the Core,‖ Foreign Policy, May 10, 2011, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/10/rotten_to_the_core. 
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Despite many years of effort, stability and reconstruction efforts are proceeding 
with difficulty in Afghanistan.  The country‘s governance remains mired in corruption 
and the security situation remains unstable.  Modern counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine 
stresses the importance of providing security and development to win the cooperation of 
an uncertain population, but it does little to illuminate the ―how‖ of that proposition.  The 
COIN practitioner is left with an ―if you build it, they will come‖ approach to security 
and development that too often leads to overfunded, top-down security and development 
projects that invite more corruption and more instability.   
What remain unanswered are some fundamental questions about winning the 
cooperation of a population in insurgency:  Why do some people decide to join the 
Taliban?  How do Afghans view and confer legitimacy?  What makes individuals and 
small groups of individuals abandon the status quo and join an insurgency?  The root 
question underlying all these is this:  Why can the Coalition not predict the way many of 
its actions will be perceived or the way those actions will affect the decisions of the 
people it seeks to influence? 
B.  IMPORTANCE 
The United States has been significantly involved in counterinsurgency operations 
in almost every decade of the 20th century.  Beginning with the Philippine Insurrection in 
the first decade, then Panama and Cuba, the Philippines again in the late 1940s, the 
Korean communist insurgency of 1950, Vietnam, El Salvador, Iraq and now Afghanistan. 
In Iraq alone, the United States has suffered over 4,000 dead and over 32,000 wounded in 
counterinsurgency and stability operations since the invasion of that country in 2003.7 
This is a new generation of conflict that is fundamentally different from the age of 
war that preceded it.  This so-called ―fourth generation‖ of warfare is much closer to the 
―people‖ than the previous generation, which was characterized by great armies 
representing the state locked in deathly combat.  This new warfare is characterized by 
ideas rather than weapons, and comes complete with its own set of problems, as the 
                                                 
7 ―Iraq Index – Saban Center for Middle East Policy,‖ The Brookings Institute, March 31, 2011, 
http://www.brookings.edu/saban/iraq-index.aspx. 
 4 
United States struggles to ―wage war on non-state actors who hide in states with which 
we are at peace, even within our own society.‖8  This new breed of warfare is fought 
more on the individual level, and is complicated by a dissonance with classical warfare, 
where attacking the enemy is the center of effort.  In this new warfare, counterinsurgent 
forces seek ways to influence an entity that they cannot physically attack:  the population. 
C.  PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
1. Shrinking Timelines 
If history is any guide, counter-revolutionary wars are long endeavors.  Britain‘s 
Malay Emergency lasted 12 years.  The French fought in Algeria for eight years before 
their ignominious withdrawal.  The United States‘ fought (openly) for nearly nine years 
in Vietnam until the ceasefire of 1973 and its equally ignominious withdrawal.  At just 
under 10 years as of this writing, America‘s war in Afghanistan is the longest in its 
history. 
Political limitations in a democracy often make COIN operations difficult to 
sustain for long periods because elected leaders are typically wary of committing large 
numbers of troops for a long time.  The political battle over the Afghanistan surge of 
2010 is a case in point:  the ISAF force component, at 132,000 troops (1:240 troop-to-
population ration), remains well short of the roughly 1:50 troops-to-population ration that 
classical COIN doctrine prescribes.9  Comparing the Vietnam force commitment to 
forces in Afghanistan, Johnson and Mason write: 
In South Vietnam, an operational area smaller than RC South, the United 
States and its allies had over 2 million men under arms, including more 
than half a million Americans, the million-man Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam (ARVN), 75,000 coalition troops, the Vietnamese Regional 
 
                                                 
8 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 291; William S. Lind, ―Understanding Fourth Generation War,‖ 
Military Review, no. September–October (2004). 
9 Thomas H. Johnson, "On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan," 
China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly 5, no. 2 (2007): 107; C. D Dessaso, Toward Development of 
Afghanistan National Stability: Analyses in Historical Military and Cultural Contexts (Army Command 
and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies, 2010), 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/PLACEMAT.MARCH%2004..pdf. 
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Forces and Popular Forces (known as ‗Ruff-Puffs‘), the South Vietnamese 
police, the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) and other militias – 
and lost.10 
Despite the precedent for high-volume and long-term commitments required in a 
counterinsurgency war, troop commitments are getting smaller and time-lines for 
withdrawal are getting shorter.  Political limitations in the Obama administration 
compelled an early withdrawal of combat forces from Iraq in 2010 as well as a deadline 
of 2014 for the withdrawal of most combat troops from Afghanistan, despite fears that 
insurgent violence will continue to undermine both governments.11 
2. New Doctrine, Old Ideas 
COIN doctrine has enjoyed a revival as a result of the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In 2006, strategic thinkers in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps drew upon 
previous work on COIN theory by well-known late colonial-era COIN experts such as 
Robert Thompson and David Galula.  The resulting Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24) gave 
the U.S. military a much needed doctrine to codify operations using counterinsurgency 
principles.  The field manual shifted the focus of military operations from an ―insurgent-
centric‖ approach of destroying insurgent forces, to a ―population-centric‖ approach that 
focused on development and security issues as a means of eroding insurgent support 
among the population.  
While this approach seemed innovative, it was essentially a retelling of hard-won 
COIN experience from the 1950s and ‗60s.  Eventually, the renewed focus on the 
population in insurgency environments lead to the reemergence of the concept of ―hearts 
and minds.‖  This term, originally credited to President Lyndon Johnson who was 
speaking of a Vietnamese pacification program that would provide economic and 
                                                 
10 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, ―Down the AfPak Rabbit Hole,‖ Foreign Policy, March 
1, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/01/down_the_afpak_rabbit_hole. 
11 Ulrike Putz, ―US Withdrawal from Iraq: Baghdad Residents Mourn Departure of Former Enemy,‖ 
Der Spiegel Online, August 30, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,714592,00.html; 
Karen DeYoung and Scott Wilson, ―With bin Laden dead, some escalate push for new Afghan strategy,‖ 
Washington Post, May 10, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/bin-ladens-killing-
requires-new-look-at-afghanistan-strategy-kerry-says/2011/05/10/AFWylfiG_story.html. 
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development assistance to the government of South Vietnam,12 has become ubiquitous in 
the modern lexicon of counterinsurgency and refers to a need to win over the population 
to the counter-insurgent‘s side through personal and public welfare programs that will 
theoretically lead the population to the government‘s side.  In contrast to the security-
centric approach of classic counterinsurgency, ―hearts and minds‖ focuses on economic 
development and assumes that when the government provides enough economic 
opportunity, people‘s loyalties will eventually follow. 
This approach appeals to the American psyche, particularly because it reflects the 
belief that American political progress and economic success go hand in hand.  As one 
author noted when reviewing a book on the subject of ―hearts and minds‖ policies in 
Malaya: 
‗Hearts and minds‘ recognizes the socioeconomic nature of the conflict 
and the consequent link between the guerrillas and a sympathetic 
population. Hence, it can ultimately succeed in defeating the insurgents by 
re-dressing some of their grievances, as happened in Malaya.13 
While there was some evidence that pacification could have been making some 
gains in Vietnam, especially after initial successes by localized integrated security and 
domestic programs such as the Marine Corps‘ Combined Action Platoon, in the end a 
combination of several political and military failures culminated in complete mission 
failure.14  Similarly, in Afghanistan, aid programs designed to foster aid and development 
may have actually worsened the conflict by providing revenue streams for the Taliban 
and empowering well-connected tribes in an area at the expense of more established 
power brokers.15 
                                                 
12 Francis Njubi Nesbitt, ―Hearts and Minds and Empire,‖ Foreign Policy in Focus, March 20, 2009, 
http://www.fpif.org/articles/hearts_and_minds_and_empire.  The term was also popularized through a 1974 
documentary of the same name. 
13 Craig A. Lockard, ―Review  of Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 
1948–1960. by Richard Stubbs,‖ The Journal of Asian Studies 49, no. 3 (1990): 1. 
14 Richard A Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle For Vietnamʼs Hearts And Minds (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1998). 





One of the problems with a catchy phrase such as ―hearts and minds‖ is that it 
soon becomes banal and becomes a substitute for critical thinking on an issue.  As one 
commentator put it:   ―The idea that you can build schools, pave roads, provide electricity 
and thereby earn the loyalty of the population does not stand up to reality.‖16  A 1970 
RAND study concludes that a ―hearts and minds‖ approach that focuses on economic 
development may be just as likely to aid the insurgent cause through increased revenue 
opportunities.  A similar report from the Iraq war came to a similar conclusion.17 
3. A “Whole-Person” Theory of Human Behavior 
As discussed above, an important tenet of contemporary COIN theory is that that 
success can be generated through a ―population-centric‖ strategy of delivering 
governance to the population, whereby they will eventually reach a level of trust and 
confidence in the capability of the COIN force to provide long-term security and shift 
their allegiance from insurgent elements to the COIN government.  Experience in 
counterinsurgencies such as the Malaya Emergency of the late 1940s and the Philippine 
Hukbalahap insurgency of the same period seems to support this hypothesis.  
Increasingly, however, COIN operations are being subjected to shrinking resources and 
timelines relative to these successful counterinsurgencies of the past, making it more 
difficult to achieve these results without a more sophisticated understanding of the 
underlying assumptions about why people decide to support the COIN effort or not.  The 
science of COIN today, even though its practice is based on classical economic theory, 
relies mostly on anecdote and analogy with past conflicts rather than a scientific 
assessment of decision processes.  This is true of most decision analysis, as Bueno de 
Mesquita complains: 
Decision making is the last frontier in which science has been locked out 
of government and business.  We live in a high-tech age with archaic 
                                                 
16 Abu Muqawama, ―Insurgents, Counterinsurgents, and the Provision of Social Services | Center for a 
New American Security‖, April 22, 2011, http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2011/04/insurgents-
counterinsurgents-and-provision-social-services.html. 
17 Nathan Constantine Leites and Charles Wolf, Rebellion and Authority: an Analytic Essay on 
Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago, IL: Markham Publishing Co., 1970), 150–52; E. Berman, J. N Shapiro, and J. 
Felter, Can hearts and minds be bought? The economics of counterinsurgency in Iraq (National Bureau of 
Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA, 2008). 
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guesswork guiding life and death decisions.  The time for peering into tea 
leaves or reading astrological charts should be long over.18 
The theory behind ―hearts and minds‖ is basically that human beings respond to 
rational economic incentives, and that if the COIN force can provide more of the ―stuff‖ 
that people feel is important, loyalties will follow.  This thinking, which has dominated 
theoretical economics for most of its history, assumes that people will make all their most 
important decisions based on the perceived likelihood of maximizing economic well-
being.  This thinking, however, does not recognize the significant contribution that non-
monetary factors such as justice, honor and cultural imperatives, make to individual 
decisions.  As Akerlof and Dickens point out: 
[W]hile economists have been elaborating their analysis, keeping their 
basic behavioral assumptions the same, sociologists, anthropologists, 
political scientists, and psychologists have been developing and validating 
models based on very different assumptions.19 
Neither the security-centric approach of classic COIN doctrine nor the 
development-centric ―hearts and minds‖ approaches incorporate some of the most 
important advances in the understanding of the human mind that came about in the 1950s 
and later, such as Solomon Asch‘s work on group conformity, Milgram‘s experiments 
regarding the nature of authority, or Muzafer Sherif‘s seminal work on group conflict.   
As COIN theory languished in the aftermath of Vietnam and the military‘s desire 
to refocus on the conventional threat of the Soviet Union, a host of social scientists, 
anthropologists, economists and psychologists were developing new models in 
understanding human behavior.  Afghanistan itself was a popular subject of 
anthropological and historical study, as the work of Jon W. Anderson, Olivier Roy and 
Louis Dupree attest.  This body of social science eventually came to inform the field of 
behavior economics that was advanced by the Nobel laureate economist Gary Becker, in 
his pioneering work on nonmonetary based preferences. 
                                                 
18 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The Predictioneerʼs Game: Using the Logic of Brazen Self-Interest to 
See and Shape the Future (New York: Random House, 2009), xxi. 
19 George A. Akerlof and William T. Dickens, ―The Economic Consequences of Cognitive 
Dissonance,‖ The American Economic Review 72, no. 3 (1982): 307. 
 9 
Since the early days of partisan warfare, many authors have understood the need 
to influence the subject population‘s decisions, if only to improve intelligence collection.  
During the American Revolutionary War, Captain Johann Ewald of the Royal Hessians 
remarked on the importance of maintaining political relations with the population: 
Above all, one cannot deal harshly enough with those villains who 
mercilessly torment the peasants who are innocent of the war… On the 
other hand, with a strict discipline and a congenial behavior one makes 
friends in the heart of enemy country.20 
The Marine Corps Small Wars Manual of 1940 asserts that ―human reactions cannot be 
reduced to an exact science, but there are certain principles which should guide our 
conduct.‖21 The Hessians and the Marines appreciated the utility of understanding the 
psyches of the people they wished to influence, but did not have a body of scientific work 
to provide a reliable framework for understanding the science of human behavior. 
Given all that we have learned about human social behavior in the latter part of 
the 20th century, it seems reasonable that this body of science could improve the state of 
the art of counterinsurgency.  Since it is widely acknowledged in COIN theory that the 
people are the ―center of gravity‖ in an insurgent conflict, then understanding the 
behavior of human beings alone and in groups could improve the success of COIN 
operations and strategies.   In this thesis, I will show that a behavioral economics 
approach that incorporates the importance of cultural norms, social influences, and even 
irrational mental biases can better describe people‘s decision outcomes in a conflict 
society than the traditional approach of separating social interventions from decision 
models.  This recognition of the role of culture and society in decision functions will lead 
to better counterinsurgency operations and, ultimately, better decision outcomes from 
those the COIN forces wish to influence.  
                                                 
20 Johann von Ewald, Robert A. Selig, and David Curtis Skaggs, Treatise on Partisan Warfare (New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 69. 
21 U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, Original (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2009), 18. 
 10 
D.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
For the purposes of this literature review, we divide the literature into competing 
camps:  the first we will refer to as the ―mono-rationalist‖ literature which is based on a 
classical economics view of decision; the second we refer to as the ―multi-rationalist‖ 
literature which suggests the applicability of behavioral economic considerations that are 
derived from cultural and social contexts.  
1. “Rationalist” COIN Literature 
Existing COIN theory is consistent with a mono-rationalist interpretation of 
human behavior.  According to this view, members of the population will decide whether 
to support the insurgency based on a rational calculation of cost and benefit.  As we have 
already noted, existing COIN theory places a great deal of emphasis on ―the people‖ as 
the center of gravity of the conflict.  Galula describes the ―battle for the population‖ as a 
―major characteristic of the revolutionary war.‖  Thompson notes that the heart of 
counterinsurgency is the ―war for the people‖ and that the government‘s ability to restore 
law and order is central to winning the loyalty of the people.  McCuen encourages active 
engagement with the populace by counterinsurgent forces, and winning over the populace 
through development efforts and security programs.  Sewall writes in the introduction to 
the Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual that the ―population waits 
to be convinced.  Who will help them more, hurt them less, stay the longest, earn their 
trust?‖22    
COIN literature focuses on security and development as a means by which the 
local population can be persuaded to side with government forces.  This is the basis for 
Kilcullen‘s thesis, viewing most of the insurgency recruits as ―accidental guerrillas‖ who 
are not highly committed to the ideological cause of the insurgency, and can be 
convinced to give up support for the insurgency with the correct combination of 
                                                 
22 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare; Theory and Practice. Foreword by Robert R. Bowie 
(New York: Praeger, 1964), 7; Robert Grainger Ker Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency; the 
Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1966), 51; John J McCuen, The Art of Counter-
Revolutionary War; the Strategy of Counter-Insurgency (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1966), 98; 
Sarah Sewall et al., The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 1st ed. (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), xxv. 
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incentives.23  This view has become widely characteristic of modern COIN thought, 
where the primary goal is changing the insurgency environment through security 
operations and economic development as a vehicle to obtaining decisions in the host 
population that are favorable to the COIN force.   Experience in counterinsurgencies such 
as the Malaya Emergency of the late 1940s and the Philippine Hukbalahap insurgency of 
the same period supports this hypothesis.   
This view of human decision in an insurgency environment is supported by an 
impressive history of economic thought.  The rationalist approach contends that people 
make choices based on their preferences, which are entirely informed by the value placed 
on various goods and services using rational calculus.  Beginning with Adam Smith, 
human decision processes have been modeled by Homo Economicus (Economic Man):  a 
being that always acted in accordance with selfish interest and sought to maximize wealth 
and prosperity.  Modern economists such as Milton Freidman and Steven Levitt share in 
common the principled belief that people respond to incentives and will make choices to 
maximize their utility (well-being).24  Modern Game Theory as typified by Bueno de 
Mesquita refines this reasoning into a predictive model for human behavior and assume 
fundamental self-interest in motivations.25   In the rational model, these incentives can be 
readily quantified in numerical terms or through some tangible benefit.   
Overall, traditional COIN theory frames the choices made by the population 
regarding whether to support the insurgency or not as a rational choice based primarily on 
considerations of security and prosperity.    The rational approach to assessing decision 
making is popular because it is simpler than the alternative.  It is difficult to assess and 
quantify the complex milieu of identities and biases involved in alternative models of 
 
 
                                                 
23 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, chap. 1. 
24 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 2nd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
1982), 9; Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden 
Side of Everything, Revised and Expanded. (New York: William Morrow, 2006), 13. 
25 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Chicago, IL: 
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1990); Bueno de Mesquita, The Predictioneerʼs Game, xxi. 
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decision-making.  Additionally, until recently, there has been very little science available 
on the feasibility of incorporating alternative decision models into an analysis of the 
economy of COIN. 
2. “Multi-Rationalist” Literature 
The literature of the emerging field of behavior economics suggests that in 
uncertain environments, considerable weight may be given to identity and culture factors 
to make decisions that will affect personal safety, income prospects and self-fulfillment.  
Gary S. Becker, a noted economist, began identifying some problems with classical 
economic theories in the late 1950s, specifically that people practiced racial 
discrimination in economic exchanges, and were willing to pay a premium to do so.  
Around the same time, Solomon Asch began a series of famous experiments that showed 
that people will often conform to in-group preferences even in the face of obvious 
evidence that the preference is incorrect.  Following up on Asch‘s work, Stanley Milgram 
showed that a majority of people will violate their own deeply-held moral convictions in 
the face of compelling authority, even willing to undergo significant mental stress while 
doing so.26    
Thaler also points to the existence of a readily quantifiable social intervention in 
people‘s rational calculus.  Classical, mono-rational economic theory predicts that a 
purely self-interested individual should seek to maximize personal profit at all times.  A 
popular series of economic experiments begun in the 1970s today shows that people have 
a compulsion to make (and demand) fair offers, despite having no strictly ―rational‖ 
incentive to do so.27   When researchers replicated these experiments in different cultural 
contexts, they saw also noted variations in the level of social intervention in different 
societies.28 
                                                 
26 See Gary Stanley Becker, The economics of discrimination (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1971); Gary I. Schulman, ―Asch Conformity Studies: Conformity to the Experimenter and/or to the 
Group?,‖ Sociometry 30, no. 1 (March 1, 1967): 26–40; Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An 
Experimental View, 1st ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1974). 
27 These experiments, known as the Ultimatum Game will be discussed in more detail in Chapter II. 
28 others, ―‗Economic man‘ in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale 
societies,‖ Behavioral and brain sciences 28, no. 6 (2005): 801. 
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Outside academia, insurgent leaders themselves have stressed the importance of 
social and spiritual factors in insurgency contexts.  Rejecting the rationalist model, 
Guevara‘s asserts that ―it is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making 
revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.‖29  Guevara suggests a ―mental tipping 
point‖ that can be brought about in the host population, where events can radically alter 
people‘s perception of the choice whether or not to support the insurgency.  Guevara 
mentions more ―non-rational‖ factors that aim to help the cause:  the revolutionary must 
be a ―true priest of reform‖ and ―an ascetic‖ in order to inspire the populace by an almost 
divine example of perfect revolutionary spirit, allowing them to identify with and support 
the cause.30  In Afghanistan, the Taliban are adept at using lyrical propaganda in the form 
of chants to influence their target populations.  Interestingly, very few of these artifacts 
appeal to rational bases in soliciting support for the Taliban movement, relying instead on 
appeals to social standards such as honor, justice, shame and righteousness.31 
A significant body of literature on Afghan social studies also exists, mostly 
drawing upon research completed before or during the Afghan-Soviet war.  The works of 
Dupree, Roy, Barfield, Johnson and Mason suggest strong social interventions in Pashtun 
decision models, which we will explore in more detail in Chapter III. 
3. Assessing the Literature 
Current counterinsurgency doctrine recognizes the importance of decision in an 
insurgency environment, but much of the COIN literature focuses on security and 
development, aka ―hearts and minds,‖ as a means by which the local population can be 
persuaded to side with government forces.   Early U.S. military COIN publications, such 
as the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual did examine the importance of decisions among 
the populations, stressing a need to understand the ―psychology‖ of the subject peoples 
and the nature of small wars as focusing on the ―social, economic, and political 
                                                 
29 Ernesto Guevara, Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1961), 47. 
30 Ibid., 79. 
31 Thomas H. Johnson and Ahmad Waheed, ―Analyzing Taliban Taranas (chants): An Effective 
Afghan Propaganda Artifact,‖ Small Wars & Insurgencies 22, no. 1 (2011): 8. 
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development of the people,‖ in addition to killing insurgents,32 but this approach lacked a 
firm scientific footing and was dismissed in favor of the mono-rationalist approach 
characteristic of ―hearts and minds‖ style pacification. 
Mono-rationalist literature may have been a sufficient intellectual base without 
any credible competing theories; however, the significant advances in the state of the art 
of behavior economics demand its inclusion in a new way of thinking about decisions.  
Classical economic theory was born in the context of Western civilization on the eve of 
rapid modernization, industrialization and urbanization, and was developed in the modern 
scientific age.  The key value functions identified in the classical economics literature 
therefore reflect the monetized economic environment from which it came.  
More and more; however, Western interactions with other cultures have stymied 
the mono-rationalist approach, as is evident by a reading of a British news dispatch 
associated with the 1897 Swat Valley revolt mentioned earlier: 
Yet another proof has been given of the wave of fanaticism which is 
sweeping along the North-West frontier of India.  Malakand was the scene 
last night of some sharp fighting, a sudden tribal rising in the Swat Valley 
taking place during the day.  The story is a curious one, as showing how 
quickly tribesmen can gather and how readily they respond to an appeal to 
their fanaticism. 
–Excerpted from The Times, Wednesday, July 28, 189733 
From tribal uprisings that plagued the British in Afghanistan to the discrimination 
tendencies studied by Becker, there is something social that makes men behave in certain 
ways.  In the past, anthropologists and ethnographers who have made this claim 
regarding peoples of eastern cultures have been accused of ―Orientalism,‖ and sharply 
rebuked with the assertion that all people‘s basic motivations were essentially the same.34 
 
                                                 
32 U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 18. 
33 Edwards, Heroes of the Age, 172. 
34 Akbar S. Ahmed, ―Ibn Khaldun and Anthropology: The Failure of Methodology in the Post 9/11 
World,‖ Contemporary Sociology 34, no. 6 (November 1, 2005): 591. 
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The literature that exists on warfare largely avoids the issue of the science of 
decision making, preferring to concentrate on a relatively simple model of rational 
decision-making that focuses on a security for loyalty approach to eroding popular 
support for the insurgent.   
Many studies have shown, however, that the security and development for loyalty 
bargain may be complicated by several other factors.  If we wish to succeed in coin, 
we‘ve got to get a handle on those other factors.  In subsequent chapters we will explore 
the economics of insurgency and pursue a better model of decision theory in a conflict 
environment.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will attempt to address the gap in the literature between current COIN 
doctrine, with its focus on the rational bargain of loyalty for security, and the findings of 
modern behavior economics, which highlights the importance of social factors in the 
decision process.  I will show that the cultural contexts in which COIN operations are 
conducted exert considerable influence on decision outcomes among the population and 
must be taken account if information strategies are to be successful.   
To accomplish this, I will define an analytical framework for analysis of behavior 
in a COIN context and apply this framework to the ethnic Pashtun case in Afghanistan to 
consider whether behavior economic theory can provide useful insights into the conduct 
of COIN operations more generally.  I have chosen the Pashtun case study for three 
reasons:  (1) there is significant anthropological, ethnographical and socio-religious 
literature that can be consulted when analyzing behavior models, (2) the ethnic Pashtun 
population in southern and eastern Afghanistan is a core constituency of the Taliban 
insurgency,35 and (3) there is a significant amount of Taliban propaganda directed at this 
constituency that can be analyzed to clarify social value functions that may not be readily 
apparent from a Western perspective.  Studying the Pashtun case in Afghanistan will 
 
                                                 
35 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, ―No Sign Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,‖ International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring): 42. 
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allow some generalizations and patterns to be recognized that can be used in the present 
and future conflicts to craft operational and communications strategies that have the most 
chance of success in an insurgent environment.   
Behavioral economics research has shown that human subjects respond in 
different ways to information that they will use to make economic decisions.  These 
responses include bias, framing and context-interpretation of the information to be 
assessed, and these different responses lead to different decision outcomes.  The majority 
of the experimental information available is from Western subjects.  I wondered if these 
findings would hold true in the context of an indigenous society in a conflict 
environment. 
F.  THESIS OVERVIEW 
The Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command recently called COIN 
doctrine an ―oxymoron,‖ complaining that it was heavy on rhetoric but was 
fundamentally untestable, due to the unique cultural context of every insurgency.36  His 
criticism of COIN doctrine echoes the complaints of many COIN practitioners who cite 
the diversity of contexts that render meaningless any set of ―rules‖ by which to abide. 
This problem was acknowledged by one of the fathers of modern counterinsurgency 
theory himself, David Galula: 
[W]hereas conventional wars of any size and shape can be counted in the 
hundreds, no more than a score of revolutionary wars have occurred, most 
of them since 1945.  Is it enough to detect laws?  Generalization and 
extrapolation from such a limited basis must rely to some extent on 
intuition, which may or may not be correct.37 
In this thesis, I advocate a more scientific understanding of the most important 
aspect of counterinsurgency strategies:  the individual decision.  I propose a behavior 
economic framework for understanding the decision to join or support an insurgency that 
takes into account social factors such as group identity and learned culture.  The 
                                                 
36 John T. Bennett, ―Olson: Counterinsurgency Ops Should ‗Involve Countering the Insurgents,‘ ‖ 
Defense News, May 26, 2010, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4643956&c=LAN&s=TOP. 
37 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare; Theory and Practice. Foreword by Robert R. Bowie, xii. 
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economic literature surveyed suggests that human beings make decisions through three 
functions which we will hereafter call ―decision personalities‖: 
1. Economic Man.  Economic Man makes decisions using calculus that aims 
to maximize possession of money or security. 
2. Irrational Man.  Irrational Man makes decisions that seek to simplify 
complex decisions and is often affected by context. 
3. Social Man.  Social Man makes decisions using calculus that aims to 
maximize his identification with a particular social group. 
 
Figure 1: Three Competing ―Decision Personalities‖ 
This thesis proposes that all human decisions rely on a combination of these three 
―decision personalities‖ and that an understanding of this phenomenon will lead to better 
counterinsurgency practice. 
In the following chapter, we will explore the nature of these three ―decision 
personalities‖ and discuss the theoretical bases of each.  In Chapter III, we will discuss 










that analyzes the Afghan insurgency in the Pashtun population of southern and eastern 
Afghanistan in terms of behavioral economics theory to test its explanatory power for the 
Pashtun case. 
Current COIN theory focuses primarily on Economic Man, but there are two other 
major decision components that are part of every decision.  A new ―decision-centric‖ 
model of COIN theory can address all three elements of the individual decision and 
improve the success rate of COIN operations. Through a better understanding of decision, 
COIN forces will create better Information Operations (IO) strategies and will achieve 
more desirable outcomes at the tactical level through individual interactions.   
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II. A NEW DECISION THEORY FOR COIN 
In the early 1950s, an American intelligence officer, Colonel Edward Lansdale, 
was assigned to the Philippines as a counterinsurgency advisor to then-defense minister 
Ramon Magsaysay.38 Lansdale was able to design many operations that were highly 
successful against the Philippine Hukbalahap (Huk) insurgency, and was an innovator in 
the pursuit of psychological advantage over the enemy.  For example, Lansdale‘s 
psychological operations (PSYOP) teams were able to capitalize on indigenous legends 
of an asuang, a vampire who feeds on the morally corrupt, to solve a local village‘s 
problem.  A company of Huk insurgents had taken residence in the hills above the village 
and was hampering the effort to fully pacify the area.  The government needed the local 
security garrison to be reallocated elsewhere, but could not reassign the troops while the 
Huk threat remained without alienating the leadership of the village.  The PSYOP team 
moved into the village and began discreetly spreading rumors of an asuang sighted in the 
area.  After waiting a few days to allow the rumor to trickle up into the hills, they laid an 
ambush on a moonless night near a known Huk patrol route.  Silently snatching the last 
man on the patrol, his neck was quickly punctured and his blood drained to simulate the 
effect of a vampire attack.  When the remainder of the patrol came back and found the 
unlucky insurgent, they were sure the asuang had gotten him, and they would be next if 
they remained in the area.  Within a day or two, the entire Huk company had moved 
out.39 
This anecdote reveals some important truths that are worth acknowledging by the 
counterinsurgent.  Rather than just a clever trick cooked up between Lansdale and his 
Filipino counterpart over a glass of beer, this operation reflects a highly sophisticated 
understanding of the science of human behavior, also generally known as behavior 
economics.  Using cultural cues, Lansdale was able to predict how these particular rebels 
would respond to very highly controlled and selectively applied information.  He knew 
                                                 
38 Interestingly, Lansdale is widely believed to be the model for the character of Colonel Edwin 
Hillandale in the classic critique of American diplomacy in the early Cold War, The Ugly American. 
39 Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An Americanʼs Mission to Southeast Asia, 1st ed. (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1972), 72. 
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based on cultural experience that the information about the asuang would be (1) quickly 
transmitted using indigenous communication schemes, (2) that it would be received 
credibly based on its source (the ―rumor mill‖) and (3) that it would produce the desired 
outcome based on the prevalence of legend and folklore in indigenous decision-making 
models.  Knowing the utility functions of the rebel communists, who were drawn from 
the subject community, he designed an operation that would produce the desired decision 
outcome. 
In a counterinsurgency environment, the center of gravity is not the enemy‘s 
military capability; rather, it is the population.  More specifically, it is the population‘s 
decision whether to support the government or to support the insurgency.  This decision 
can have many degrees of commitment, and can change with time and circumstance.  
Thus, what is required for a successful counterinsurgency campaign is an understanding 
of the human decision functions pertinent to the conflict.  If we are to understand the 
nuances of decision, and be able to have a hope of predicting decisions in a conflict 
environment, we need to understand a bit about economics, the science of decision.  In 
this chapter, we will review the role of decision in military thought and explain the 
dissociation between decision theory and COIN doctrine.  We will then present an 
alternative framework for understanding decisions in a counterinsurgency context that is 
based on a behavior economics framework.  
A. AN ECONOMICS APPROACH 
Economics is one of several disciplines devoted to characterizing human 
behavior.  The fields of psychology, sociology, criminology, anthropology and many 
other ―ologies‖ attempt to do this same thing.  What distinguishes these fields is the 
approach they use to arrive at their conclusions.  For example, sociology attempts to 
classify and predict human behavior based upon a study of a particular society‘s 
characteristic institutions and organizations.  Psychology attempts to predict human 
behavior in terms of understanding the individual motivations and peculiarities inherent 
in human thought.  Anthropologists examine the history of the development of a 
particular society in order to predict the general behavior patterns of its members.  By 
contrast, the economic approach, which we will hereafter refer to as behavior economics, 
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propounds the prediction of human behavior through the study of human preferences and 
the extent to which human beings will pursue those preferences to maximize their 
pleasure.40 
Before we proceed, we should define the basic economics terms that we will 
utilize in this discussion.  The desire to maximize a certain positive asset, or ―good,‖ can 
be described as a ―preference‖ for that thing.  For example, if one has a preference for 
chocolate over vanilla, that person will most likely choose chocolate ice cream when 
visiting an ice cream parlor.  Once preferences are established, that person can be said to 
have a ―utility function,‖ or motivation to pursue outcomes that maximize the possession 
or incidence of that preference.  Using the previous example, the utility function produces 
an outcome of having chocolate ice cream when a person is placed in the environment of 
an ice cream parlor.  More elegantly, the utility function is a ―mathematical expression 
that characterizes what people care about.‖41 For example, if a person‘s utility function 
sought to maximize the possession of money, you could expect that person to choose to 
join an insurgency if the expected utility of the mercenary pay offered was higher than 
the perceived negative utility of being killed by the counterinsurgents.  This person could 
be described as having a ―goods-based‖ utility function that was dominated by seeking to 
maximize possession of ―goods‖ (in this case, money).  By contrast, a guerrilla who 
joined an insurgent movement and forsook pay in favor of social esteem would be 
described as having an ―identity-based‖ utility function.  These examples are necessarily 
stark, and real people usually fall somewhere in between, but the examples are for 
illustration.  In short, the concepts of preferences and utility functions give economists a 
useful framework for predicting behavior.   
There are three utility functions which human beings use to make decisions which 
we will discuss in this chapter, each of which corresponds to one of the ―decision 
identities‖ we introduced in the first chapter:  the ―Goods-based‖ utility function 
(―Economic Man‖), the ―Context-based‖ utility function (―Irrational Man‖), and the 
                                                 
40 Gary Stanley Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1976), 3–4. 
41 George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our 
Work, Wages, and Well-Being (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 9. 
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―Identity-based‖ utility function (―Social Man‖).  All human decisions can be described 
as interactions between these three utility functions.  Through awareness of the relative 
value placed upon each utility system in a target population, a counterinsurgent can build 
strategies that are appropriate to the decision functions of the population she wishes to 
influence. 
1. A Theory of “Economic Man” 
The writings of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill created the idea of homo 
economicus—the ―economic man‖—a being who used perfect rationality and whose 
behavior could be predicted by analysis of well-being-based preferences.  Classic 
economic theory contends that people make decisions that will maximizes physical 
security—physical security that is typically thought of (in a Western narrative) as the 
money required to buy the things that sustain life in a capitalist economy.  These 
preferences were simplified into the concept of the utility function, through which a 
person interprets information from the environment and converts that information into a 
decision.  This process is depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: An ―Economic Man‖ Utility Function 
 
In the goods-based utility function, the input of the environment is interpreted by 
the individual solely in terms of maximizing economic well-being.  This means the 















shelter that will result.  This approach is popular because it seems intuitive, particularly 
from a Western perspective, which idealizes individualism and usually assumes a high 
degree of self-interest.   
As the science of economics advanced, economists have come to understand that 
simple pecuniary-based rationality functions such as the one above are insufficient to 
predict human behavior.  For example, why do some people prefer vanilla ice cream to 
chocolate?  There is no rational reason why people should choose one flavor over the 
other, given equal pricing and availability, yet people do.  Or, perhaps more usefully, 
why do rural Pashtun villagers join the Taliban?  Hessian Captain Johann von Ewald‘s 
description of the American garrison at West Point barracks during the American 
Revolutionary War illustrates that there are more factors involved than simple economics 
in people‘s decisions to take great risk: 
The men looked haggard and pallid and were poorly dressed.  Indeed, very 
many stood quite proudly under arms without shoes and stockings.  
Although, I shuddered at the distress of these men, it filled me with awe 
for them, for I did not think there was an army in the world which could 
be maintained as cheaply as the American army.42 
There is no direct economic payoff from these actions, yet people still participate in these 
activities.  In order to explain seemingly nonrational behavior, economists needed to take 
into account nontraditional utility functions, such as identity and context.  Becker warns 
that when rational calculus seems to be invalid, there exist ―costs, monetary or psychic, 
of taking advantage of these opportunities that eliminate their profitability—costs that 
may not be easily ―seen‖ by outside observers.‖43   
Since we have demonstrated the insufficiency of a purely economic basis for 
decision, let us look at the other two ―decision personalities‖ that may reveal a more 
complete model for the way people really make decisions. 
                                                 
42 Ewald, Selig, and Skaggs, Treatise on partisan warfare, 2. 
43 Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, 7. 
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2. A Theory of “Irrational Man” 
A Context-Based utility theory posits that decision outcomes are subject to 
variations in context.  By context, we mean that variations in the way the information is 
presented can have important effects on the way the information is interpreted.  When 
people are about to make a decision, they will often gather information from various 
sources, and often the information conflicts.  They will triage and prioritize the 
information based on context and how favorably they feel about the way it is presented.   
We hesitate to use the term ―Irrational Man,‖ due to the pejorative nature of the 
term ―irrational.‖  But what we mean here is that this utility function is the one that 
people will delegate a significant portion of the decision process to ―instinct‖ based on 
the way the information is presented. 
a. Cognitive Dissonance 
One of the difficulties of human coping is dealing with conflicting 
information.  Human beings, uniquely among the species require their wits for their 
survival.  Often, humans must rely on incomplete information when making decisions, 
and fill in the remainder using assumptions from their specific cultural narrative.  When 
new information conflicts with cherished beliefs, a great deal of psychological discomfort 
results.  This discomfort, which psychologists refer to as ―cognitive dissonance‖ is due to 
the resultant stress of having to alter many assumptions upon which many other facets of 
survival depend.   
Akerlof and Dickens propose three premises for cognitive dissonance:  (1)  
people have preferences about how they interpret their surroundings  (2)  people can 
manipulate their beliefs by selecting sources of information likely to confirm ―desired‖ 
beliefs and  (3)  that beliefs persist over time.44  This means that when information is 
presented to a person that challenges a preferred ―narrative‖ about the way the world 
works, they will often reject that information that they perceive as anathema to a belief 
system, and bend other perceptions to fit a desired worldview.   
                                                 
44 Akerlof and Dickens, ―The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance,‖ 307. 
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Akerlof and Dickens conclude that ―beliefs are adopted if the net 
pecuniary and psychic benefits are positive.  Because of cognitive dissonance, beliefs are 
persistent once adopted.‖45  This tendency can be useful in explaining many troubling 
events from the Columbia shuttle disaster to the failure of the U.S. MACV strategy in 
Vietnam.  People like to view themselves as having made correct decisions.   
b. Desire for Simplicity 
Thaler and Sunstein posit that there are two systems of human thought, the 
Reflective System, where decisions are made based on actual calculation and the 
Automatic System, where decisions are made intuitively, rather than analytically.46  This 
tendency has evolved in humans over time as a means of simplifying decision processes.  
In these cases, context matters, and people‘s interpretation of information upon which 
they will base their decisions can be affected by the environment in which one makes the 
decision. 
What this really means is that humans have no idea of the actual cost of 
things.  They really only know the cost relative to something that they can readily 
compare it with.  For example, research has shown that people often have difficulty 
making decisions without the presence of a suitable comparison.  This is why if you want 
to sell a bread machine, or anything else, you need to have a similar but more expensive 
version next to it to compare it against.47  This effect is known in behavior science as 
anchoring.  Anchoring simplifies complex comparisons by providing a similar choice 
with which to compare an item you would like to purchase or a choice that you would 
like to make.  Anchoring allows our Automatic System to make a complex decision using 
a simple comparison.  While the bread machine example may seem trivial, what is 
important here is that people are willing to pay more money for something simply 
because there was something more expensive with which to compare it. 
                                                 
45 Akerlof and Dickens, ―The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance,‖ 316. 
46 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness, 1st ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 19. 
47 Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions (New York: 
Harper, 2009), 14–15.  The Williams-Sonoma store introduced a $275 bread-making machine into their 
inventory.  Sales were slow until they introduced a larger, more expensive version which was placed next 
to the smaller, cheaper bread maker.  Sales of the smaller machine took off shortly thereafter. 
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c. Salience Theory 
The perceived ―salience‖ of a risk will affect how people calculate its 
likelihood, and can have an effect on decision outcomes.  Thaler and Sunstein note that 
this is why many people are more afraid of a plane crash than they are of a car crash, 
even though significantly more people die in car crashes than plane crashes every year; 
car crashes don‘t typically make the news.  Thus, ―[people] assess the likelihood of risks 
by asking how readily examples come to mind.  If people can easily think of relevant 
examples, they are far more likely to be frightened and concerned than if they cannot,‖48 
regardless of the actual likelihood of the occurrence.  
Salience can create self-fulfilling prophecies in a population.  In the 
context of a society in violent conflict, violence creates perception of risk, which causes 
people to perceive more uncertainty in the viability of investment in society.  
Economically, this leads to a lower savings rate and socially causes people to coalesce 
into homogeneous groupings, often along ethnic lines (Iraq at the height of its civil war in 
2005-2007 is a good example of this).  The lower savings leads to lower capital levels in 
society and lower investment.  The lower social capital creates a perception of ―other‖ 
between populations and can cause violent reprisals.  The combination of these factors 
leads to greater corruption, less security, and consequently, more violence.  The cycle 
continues (See Figure 3).   
                                                 
48 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 25. 
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Figure 3:   Basic Violence Cycle 
 
Differences in risk salience can cause problems trying to predict priorities 
of others in a negotiation:  the Army captain in the introduction had a much different 
view of risk, sleeping as he did in a guarded FOB, compared to the Afghan villagers he 
was interacting with, who typically awake to find threatening night letters nailed to the 
door of the mosque.   For most decisions, people rely on what Thaler and Sunstein refer 
to as the ―lizard brain.‖49  This will be particularly true when people are making 
decisions under stress and based on incomplete information.  In these situations, humans 
look for answers in their identities and in the context in which information is presented to 
them.  Using context simplifies the decision process by using correlates such as anchors 






                                                 















lower risk in the decision-makers minds, since making a decision consistent with group 
norms will at least invoke the support of the group.  We will discuss this tendency more 
in the next section. 
In summary, a context-based utility function of ―Irrational Man‖ can be 
thought of as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4:   An ―Irrational Man‖ Utility Function 
 
3. A Theory of “Social Man” 
Since Gary Becker‘s work on non-monetary based tastes and preferences, the 
fields of social science and psychology have increasingly been applied to economic 
theory.50  This has resulted in a new field of economic theory, typified by Akerlof and 
Kranton, which treats social identity as a major determinant in economic behavior.  More 
precisely, human beings will act in ways that are not consistent with a goods-based 
approach to maximizing control of assets in favor of an identity-based approach that will 
seek to maximize inclusion in a social group. 
An economic experimental method called the Ultimatum Game shows that people 
will not act in a purely goods-based manner in certain situations.  In 1982, three German 
economists conducted a series of experiments to measure whether people would use 
behavior norms when dealing with bargaining.  The experimental subjects were two 
volunteers; one designated an Allocator and the other a Recipient.  The Allocators were 
                                                 













asked to divide a sum of money (perhaps 20 Deutsche Mark coins) in any way they saw 
fit between themselves and the Recipient.  If the Recipient accepted the amount, the deal 
was struck and both parties kept the agreed amounts.  If the Recipient refused, both 
parties received nothing.   
Classical economic theories predicted that the recipients would accept any 
positive value, since it was essentially free money, but this experiment and many others 
replicating it have consistently shown that Allocators largely offer an even split on the 
amount, indicating that societal norms of fairness are affecting the bargain.51  There are 
two explanations why the Allocators make such fair offers.  Either they receive personal 
satisfaction (utility) by maintaining a societal ―fairness norm‖ in their dealings that is 
greater than the value of the 9 extra Deutsche Marks that classical economics says they 
should keep, or there is a fear that if they depart from the fairness norm in order to 
maximize profit, the other party will be willing to pay the cost of rejection in favor of the 
opportunity to punish them for their breach of the social contract.  Either way, there is 
without a doubt a ―social‖ variable that causes people to act in ways that are not 
consistent with classical economic theories. 
a. Group Affinity and Identification 
Groups can be said to exist when they meet four criteria:  (1) they 
biologically replicate, (2) share fundamental values, (3) have a unique means of 
communication and interaction and (4) are self-defined and recognized by others.52   
Shaw adds that a groups involve interactions where ―each person influences and is 
influenced by each other person.‖53  Groups create and sustain important concepts that 
will be discussed later, such as legitimacy and authority. 
Human beings, as social animals, have a need to be included in a group.  
Groups provide safety from predators and can help ensure the survival of progeny if 
something should happen to a parent in the group.  Thus, people are willing to sacrifice 
                                                 
51 Richard H. Thaler, ―The Ultimatum Game,‖ Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, no. 4 (1988): 
195–96. 
52 Thomas J. Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2010), 20. 
53 Marvin E. Shaw, Group Dynamics, 3rd ed. (New York: Mcgraw-Hill College, 1981), 8. 
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certain individual preferences in favor of group preferences in order to signal their 
inclusion in the group.  This inclusion will provide long-term security and stability. 
Groups are the building blocks of any society ranging from a small village 
to large, complex societies.  Identity springs from the inclusion or exclusion from some 
group.  Groups create norms, or standards of behavior for group inclusion, as well as 
creating structures for the legitimate exercise of authority.  Groups self-propagate through 
the learned behavior, or culture, of practicing members.  Finally, groups compete with 
other groups for dominance.  All these factors should be understood in order to 
understand group identity.  There are two approaches to understanding group behavior 
which we will discuss:  Group psychology and group sociology. 
In a seminal study of group formation and identity, Muzafer Sherif and a 
group of researchers took two groups of pre-adolescent boys to Robbers Cave State Park 
in Oklahoma in the early 1950s.  The groups were not made aware of each other until the 
second phase of the experiment, after which the groups formed a durable group ―culture,‖ 
complete with social norms, flags and emblems and eventually a strong sense of 
resentment and hostility towards the other group.54  The existence of social groupings 
among humans creates a strong incentive to identify with a group, thus obtaining the 
long-term benefits of social inclusion.  Group identity consists of tastes and preferences 
that are derived from the social norms of the subject grouping and change based on the 
―social setting and who is interacting with whom.‖  A desire to identify with a specific 
social group will lead to behaviors that are believed to be consistent with that group.55 
b. Conformity 
Identity with a group requires the individual to adopt behaviors that are 
consistent with the values of the group.  Norms are created by groups and form the 
―rulebook‖ for expected behavior by group members.  By following norms, people can be 
                                                 
54 Muzafer Sherif, The Robbers Cave experiment: Intergroup conflict and cooperation (Norman, OK: 
University Book Exchange, 1961). 
55 Akerlof and Kranton, Identity Economics, 4.  Akerlof and Kranton refer to this as the ―merry-go-
round‖ effect to explain why children from different age groups, although experiencing the same stimulus 
from an enjoyable merry-go-round ride, will display markedly different behaviors.  The young children 
display euphoria while the older teenagers exhibit reserved embarrassment. 
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confident in their status of group inclusion, which acts as a means of lowering 
psychological stress in uncertain environments.  According to Sherif, norms also provide 
a systematic predictor for the way groups interact with other members of the group as 
well as outside members.56 
Norms provide a means of identification for group members as well as 
provide rules and regulations that ensure the integrity and viability of the group in the 
long term.  Members are expected to subordinate their individual norms to group norms 
in order to maintain their group membership.  Failure to do so will often lead to censure 
or even ostracization by the larger group.  Norms are a common feature of all social 
groups.  As soon as a group establishes itself, a defining system of ideals and 
characteristics to be upheld emerges and is highly resistant to change.57 
The power of the motivation to conform to perceived group standards is 
supported by a great deal of research.  In the 1950s, Solomon Asch performed a series of 
conformity experiments in which naïve subjects were asked to state which of a series of 
lines was the longest.  The subject was seated at a table with several confederates of the 
experimenter who had secretly been instructed to give the same, incorrect answer to the 
questions.  Asch‘s results indicated that a significant fraction of respondents gave 
answers that their eyes told them were incorrect in order to conform with the group 
consensus.58  
Research by Hoff and Pandey among Indians showed that lower caste 
individuals performed 23 percent worse when their caste status was revealed to the 
subject group prior to beginning a series of maze puzzles, despite a significant monetary 
incentive for successful completion of the mazes.59  These findings were replicated by 
other researchers studying the effects of stereotype on behavior.  In a series of behavior 
experiments, a group of Asian-American women were tasked with performing a series of 
                                                 
56 Muzafer Sherif, Groups in harmony and tension,: An integration of studies on intergroup relations 
(London: Octagon Books, 1973), 233. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Shaw, Group Dynamics, 173. 
59 George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, Identity Economics, 30–31.  In India, surnames indicate 
caste, and the experimenters noted a distinct performance difference when the sessions were begun with a 
―roll call‖ read aloud to the subject group. 
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simple mathematics problems.  The results showed that average individual performance 
changed depending on whether the experimenters ―primed‖ the subjects with preliminary 
questions about their race or sex.  Those primed with questions relating to their Asian 
heritage performed markedly better on the math test than those primed with questions 
relating to their female status.  Presumably, these results are related to pervasive 
stereotypes about the mathematical abilities of women and Asians.   
Interestingly, the ―gender-primed‖ group was subconsciously willing to 
sacrifice the satisfaction of performing well on a math test in order to reinforce 
membership in the ―women‖ group.  More remarkably, this effect was also evident on 
people who were not even members of the ―stereotype‖ group.  In related experiments, 
subjects‘ behaviors were modified to match stereotypes by simple suggestions before 
completing the exams, such as questions about old age or impatience.60  Other research 
has shown that social imperatives are not as strong with interactions across cultures.   
Variants of the Ultimatum Game have shown that people will tend to be less ―generous‖ 
when they know the recipient in the ultimatum game is from a different culture or 
ethnicity.61   
An interesting variant of the Ultimatum Game showed that people will 
default to normative, socially acceptable behavior until they can discern an indisputable 
advantage in operating in a goods-based, maximizing way.  When players were subject to 
a multi-round ultimatum game, in which the Allocators and Recipients switched roles 
between rounds, players were more likely to exhibit maximizing behavior in later rounds 
as they gained experience.62  This suggests that risk-averse people will default to the 
relative safety of behavior deemed ―acceptable‖ by the social norms of society until they 
can perceive a ―foolproof‖ way to maximize profit.  People in the first rounds were still 
reluctant to depart from social norms even when encouraged by the experimenters to 
                                                 
60 Akerlof and Kranton, Identity Economics, 30–31; Ariely, Predictably Irrational, 169–170.  In 
several experiments, young graduate students were observed walking noticeably slower or behaving 
measurably more impatient after being primed with questions about old age and impatience, respectively. 
61 George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, Identity Economics, 9. 
62 Thaler, ―The Ultimatum Game,‖ 199. 
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behave in profit-maximizing ways.  This is important because it suggest that people can 
change their ―decision personality‖ based on circumstance. 
The sum of the norms of the group can be described as ―culture.‖  Culture 
in turn creates a unique way of interpreting information and forms ―the means by which 
reality is created and grasped.‖63  Cultures are ―durable, persistent spontaneous orders, 
once they are established.‖ And are means by which in-group members cooperate and 
communicate.  Through adoption of cultural standards, an individual becomes a bona-
fide member of the group, eligible for access to in-group ―club goods.‖64 
Munger points to the example of the evolution of cultural artifacts such as 
―kosher‖ and ―halal‖ as a means of protecting prescientific societies from potentially 
dangerous foods.65  In this way, norms and culture can be considered as prehistoric safety 
mechanisms through which groups ensured their survival by preventing activities that 
could be dangerous to the group.  The learned culture surrounding a person creates 
powerful, nonmonetary based incentives that can have profound effects on behavior, and 
can even motivate people to give their lives for a cause which classic rationality would 
not predict.  In effect, culture and identity create their own preferences, and have evolved 
over time as a means of maintaining security in the long term.    
c. Authority and Legitimacy 
Group identification and conformity to group norms provide the basis for 
conferring legitimacy on authority in social groups.  As groups form, they naturally 
create the institutions of authority by which group norms and values are maintained.  
Milgram‘s work on authority indicates people will obey authority figures, even when the 
directions are contrary to the people‘s own moral judgment.  Milgram‘s work shows that 
people will submit to authority even if the commands are contrary to their personally held 
beliefs.  Subjects were assigned as ―teacher‖ to a confederate and instructed to administer 
electric shocks if the ―subject‖ answered incorrectly.  Milgram notes that ―obedience to 
                                                 
63 Lawrence Rosen, ―Reply [From Lawrence Rosen],‖ Contemporary Sociology 36, no. 2 (March 1, 
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authority occurs within a hierarchical structure in which the actor feels that the person 
above has the right to prescribe behavior.‖66  This feeling of legitimacy can be conferred 
in several ways, as Max Weber has identified:  through a rational assessment, through 
tradition or habit, or by charismatic persuasion.67  We will discuss the concept of 
authority in the Pashtun case at length in the following chapter. 
d. Narrative 
Narrative is the means by which norms are transmitted and interpreted in a 
society.  It also serves as a means for members of a subject society to interpret and make 
sense of their environment.  Ruston defines ―narrative‖ as:   
A system of stories that hang together and provide a coherent view of the 
world.  People use narratives to understand how their world 
works.  Narratives contain patterns that fit the data of everyday life 
(events, people, actions, sequences of actions, messages, and so on), 
explaining how events unfold over time and how one thing causes 
another.68 
Narrative forms an important means of group preservation by the 
transmission of group norms and ideals between group members.  Narrative also forms a 
means of discouraging cultural innovation by means of providing a cognitive ―anchor‖ 
for the thought processes of in-group members.  We will discuss unique means of 
narrative transmission in Pashtun culture in the next chapter. 
In summary, the identity-based utility of ―Social Man‖ can be depicted as 
shown in Figure 5: 
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Figure 5: A ―Social Man‖ Utility Function 
 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This new interpretation of the classic utility function asserts that being able to 
identify with certain groups has its own payoffs that are not discernable from a strictly 
well-being based view of preferences.69  Human beings, being social creatures, have 
created these ―identity functions‖ to create security in uncertain environments and create 
means by which a group can maintain order and survivability.  Members who wish to 
maximize inclusion in a specific group may defer outcomes that maximize short-term 
well-being for the opportunity to increase long-term inclusion in a group. 
All people make decisions according to an interaction between the three decision 
utility theories discussed in this chapter.  I will call this the ―Whole Person‖ Utility 
function, and it is key to understanding human behavior.  This is the approach taken by 
Durlauf in his attempt to construct a behavior model based on social factors.70  In the 
next chapter, we will discuss the ―Social Man‖ decision personality of the Pashtun at 
length using the model we have presented here.  By understanding the relative ―weight‖ 
that the Pashtuns place on individual ―decision personalities,‖ we can gain a better grasp 
of decisions in conflict environments like Afghanistan. 
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III. A “SOCIAL MAN” MODEL OF PASHTUN DECISION 
MAKING 
In order to understand the decision models in tribal Pashtun society, it is 
necessary to understand the institutions that make up the Pashtun worldview.   The 
Pashtuns are part of a very old tribal structure that has inhabited the lands south of the 
Hindu Kush, between the central Afghan highlands and the Indus River valley for about 
1,000 years.  As Afghanistan‘s largest ethnic group, they have dominated Afghan politics 
since 1747, when Ahmed Shah Durrani, the forbear of the politically dominant Durrani 
(sometimes referred to as ―Abdali‖) Pashtuns, carved the area that is now Afghanistan 
from between the declining Iranian Safavid and Indian Moghul Empires.71   
It is rather difficult to try and speak of the Pashtun as a homogeneous entity.  
Though they claim descent from a common ancestor, the various tribes of the Pashtun 
have very diverse traditions, as is evident when comparing the mostly settled agrarian 
Durrani and their mountain-dwelling Karlanri cousins, for instance.  Also, there are 
distinct differences between rural and urban Pashtuns.  The former are more egalitarian 
and kinship ties are often more important than capital assets, while the latter tend to be 
more hierarchical and invested in monetary economics.72  These differences are functions 
of the different environments and coping strategies of the two constituencies, and could 
be the topic of an entirely separate work.  For the purposes of this chapter, however, we 
will focus on the common social-centric aspects of Pashtun society, which will tend to be 
characteristic of rural Pashtuns.  What is important to understand is that all Pashtuns 
make conscious decisions using a combination of their ―Social Man‖ and ―Economic 
Man‖ utility functions, and Western efforts to influence Pashtuns have not given Pashtun 
―Social Man‖ sufficient due.73   
In this chapter, we will introduce the social aspects of Pashtun society that are 
relevant to the construction of the ―whole-person‖ decision model that we presented in 
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Chapters I and II.  Social utility is very important in rural Pashtun society because, in the 
absence of a monetized economy, personal relationships become of primary importance 
to the maintenance of security and well-being.  We will discuss the models of group 
identification and group conformity, authority and legitimacy and the maintenance 
methods in which social institutions are preserved and propagated to subsequent 
generations.  Finally, we will show how these artifacts fit into a behavior economics-
based model of behavior, particularly in the context of the significant social upheaval that 
has taken place in Afghanistan over a generation. 
A. GROUP IDENTIFICATION 
As noted in the previous chapter, human beings have a tendency to coalesce into 
social groupings in order to meet various needs, ranging from the basic survival needs to 
psychological comfort needs.  The Pashtun are no different in this regard.  What is 
important to understand is the unique ways that the physical and cultural environments of 
Afghan society interact to create various group identification structures.  Rural Pashtun 
society, in the context of a patron-client based, subsistence economy produces different 
social interventions in the ―Social Man‖ model of Pashtun decision-making that may not 
be readily recognized from a Western, monetized and capitalist economy perspective. 
The Pashtun seem hard to predict because their personalities are manifestations of 
the conflict between the normative institutions in their culture.  Quoting an old British 
Army Field Manual, Anderson describes the Pashtun in this way: 
The Afghan character is a strange blend of virtue and vice‘; a litany of the 
usual specifications (‗brave,‘ ‗treacherous,‘ ‗hospitable,‘ ‗severe,‘ 
‗generous,‘ ‗greedy‘) summarily concludes that ‗The race in short is a 
mass of contradictions which are accentuated by the strong individuality 
of the people.‘74 
Pashtuns are part of a patronage-based society in which group identity is very important.  
Group membership guarantees physical security and provides a means of certainty about 
the future.  The egalitarian nature of Pashtun society allows for shifting identity patterns 
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that can complicate understanding of the Pashtun social utility function.  In order to 
understand the dynamics of Pashtun identity, it is necessary to begin with an 
identification of the competing identity choices from which Pashtuns may select.  
Generally, Pashtuns have two modes of self-identity that sometimes compete and often 
cooperate.  Patrilineal descent creates a strong impetus for tribal/familial identity schemes 
while the pervasive influence of Islam throughout society creates a complementary 
Islamic identity. 
The qawm is the basic unit of social identity in Afghanistan.  It is a flexible term 
that depends on context, and with whatever particular group which the Pashtun wishes to 
associate at the time.75  Group identities, rather than individual identities, tend to be 
group-reinforced, and highly impervious to influences from outside the group.76  The 
qawm can be thought to consist of concentric rings of solidarity ties that are based on 
kinship and patron-client relationships.77  The rings represent family, extended family, 
clan, tribe, confederacy, and major cultural-linguistic group.  The hierarchy of loyalties 
corresponds to these circles and becomes more intense as the circle gets smaller (see 
Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Qawm Rings 
 
Pashtuns see their identities and commitments within the context of these 
concentric rings, seldom accepting help or dictation from an outside agency, such as the 
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government, when smaller ―rings‖ can meet their needs.  This reflects the structure of 
patrilineal tribal systems:  loyalties are kept close to the individual and immediate 
familial surroundings, accepting limited influence from ―higher order‖ loyalty schemes 
such as nationalism and ideology. 
Pashtuns identify themselves patrilineally by their descent through one of the four 
clans (Pashto –khel), namely: the Durrani of southern and western Afghanistan, the 
Ghilzai of the east, the Gurghusht in the southeast and the Karlanri of the Afghan-
Pakistan frontier.78  The work of several anthropologists and ethnographers suggests that 
there is a heavy emphasis on group identity in tribal Pashtun society.  Barfield notes that 
―rural Afghanistan…provides an excellent example of a place where tribal and ethnic 
groups take primacy over the individual.‖ At the same time, the patrilineal nature of 
Pashtun identity structures creates identity groups of small size that are fiercely 
egalitarian.79   
In sometime conflict and partnership with clan-based identity is Islamic identity.  
Islam makes up an important part of the Pashtun self-identity and subsequent worldview.  
As Barfield notes:  ―Afghanistan is an example of an older form of Islamic society in 
which religion is not an ideology but remains an all-encompassing way of life.‖80  Islam 
has traditionally been so ingrained in Afghan society that it was seen as not needing a 
political apparatus to advance its interests.  This pervasiveness of Islam in life leads to a 
very personal manifestation of religion that expresses itself in nearly every aspect of life, 
coloring the language and traditions with analogies and sayings of the Prophet.  
Interestingly, the personal nature of religion also results in a rather low station of the 
clergy in village life.  The village mullah is usually a hereditary position that stays well 
outside the levers of power in the village.81   
Westerners tend to view Islamic practice, particularly in the countryside, as a 
―utilitarian‖ set of rules empty of intellectual foundation.  It is important to understand 
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Islam‘s social meaning in the context of tribal Pashtuns.  As Roy notes, Islam provides a 
transcendental connection to the universal, as well as a deep sense of ―aspiration to 
live…life in accordance with an ethical model… In Islam, truth is something that you 
arrive at less by interpretation than by imitation.‖82  In short, Islam provides the means 
for the rural Pashtun peasant to think about and interpret the greater world around him 
through application of a moral standard and a common language with which to 
communicate those standards within the group. 
B. GROUP CONFORMITY  
The normative philosophy for Pashtun group identity is the Pashtun code, the 
Pashtunwali.83  Pashtunwali is the most important peer-reinforced manifestation of 
Pashtun group conformity and social identity.  This fusion of ideology and code of 
common law provides a set of social boundaries that maintain group integrity and provide 
a means of group administration, focusing on reputation and personal honor (nang) as the 
prime traits to be protected.  Among the core tenets of the code are self-respect, 
independence, justice, hospitality, forgiveness, and tolerance.   It also creates a system of 
core values at the personal level, such as:  freedom, honor, revenge, and chivalry.  Since 
the code theoretically applied to all Pashtuns, it provided a means of maintaining law and 
order by creating a structure by which kinship networks could legitimately be mobilized 
to right a perceived wrong, usually through revenge (badal).  In short, pashtunwali is the 
―sum total of collective expectations‖ in the Pashtun environment.84 
Pashtunwali as a group norm is consistent with the framework of normative 
behavior as identified by Sherif, which we discussed in the previous chapter.  The code is 
primarily self-reinforcing by all group members and applies equally to authority figures 
and members of the group alike.  In fact, it is the prime means by which authority is 
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legitimized in Pashtun society.  The ability to defend the basic core values of Pashtunwali 
is indicative of the Pashthun social standing.  For example, as Edwards notes, the concept 
of namus includes: 
All those things [a Pashtun] has that other men might desire and whose 
inviolability to those desires constitutes the primary criterion of his worth 
in the tribe.  A man who is incapable of defending his namus is referred to 
as daus (cuckold).85 
In light of the importance of namus, it becomes evident why the disarming of a Pashtun 
has such important social implications, as a man who is unable to defend his namus 
enjoys very little social security in the tribal environment.  This lack of security can cause 
significant psychological discomfort to a tribe member.  The Taliban are keenly aware of 
this, and cultural appeals to the ability to protect namus are evident in some of their 
propaganda, as this excerpt from a Taliban shabnamah (night letter) shows: 
Non-Muslims want to kill and pit Afghan against Afghan and in the name 
of Talib they are attacking everybody and they are killing Afghans and 
destroying your houses and they are destroying Islamic madrasahs 
(Islamic schools) in Afghanistan. They burn their Afghan arms and 
ammunitions. They want to make Afghanistan as helpless as Palestine.86 
By appealing to the Pashtunwali concept of namus, the Taliban are able to access an 
effective artifact of group conformity that serves to identify their cause within the 
existing Pashtun values system.   
By contrast, efforts to coopt Pashtun peasants into an alternative ―decision 
personality‖ by appealing to ―Economic Man‖ decision models has often backfired, as is 
evident in the example of the 1978 rural revolt that would directly precipitate the Soviet 
invasion.  The socialist, urban-centric Khalqi government that had taken power in the 
wake of the coup against Daud considered the existing system of patronage that existed in 
the countryside as ―feudalism‖ and sought to replace the existing social order with a new 
one that would focus on land redistribution.  Edwards writes: 
                                                 
85 Edwards, Heroes of the Age, 58. 
86 Quoted in Thomas H. Johnson, ―The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night 
Letters),‖ Small Wars & Insurgencies 18, no. 3 (2007): 322. 
43 
 
One of the principal tactics of the revolution from the first was to brand 
landowners, of even modest means, as ―feudals‖ in order to separate them 
from the larger number of landless peasants, tenant farmers, and 
agricultural workers. This was to be the primary means by which the party 
would jump-start the revolution, the assumption being that there was a 
widespread underlying antagonism against the wealthy that few were 
willing to express openly.87 
This would be accomplished through the expansion of state bureaucracy and sold through 
political theater rallies in which 
Formerly landless peasants would be brought forward to receive deeds to 
recently confiscated land…[M]any of the peasants who were placed in this 
position found it humiliating to be recognized publicly for their economic 
misfortunes. The categories intoned time and again by the Khalqis in 
reference to the rural poor-terms such as ―exploited masses,‖ ―struggling 
peasantry,‖ ―long suffering toilers‖-carried an ignominious connotation for 
most Afghans, for whom the status of victim was insulting.88 
The Khalqis made a miscalculation here by publicly affirming that a group of peasants in 
each village was unable to defend their own namus, and needed the government to 
protect their namus for them.  The peasants had a perfect opportunity to act in a self-
interested, ―Economic Man‖ way, but a social intervention (Pashtunwali) prevented them 
from doing so. 
Pashtunwali provides the framework for group conformity necessary for the day-
to-day functionality and long-term survival of Pashtun identity groups.  The patrilineal 
nature of Pashtun ethnic identity groups creates identity groups that are of small size.  
This creates small cadres of competing ―cousin groups‖ with limited supra-tribal 
capability, making Pashtun groups susceptible to organized, large-scale aggression from 
outside.  To defend against large-scale threats, a mechanism for large-scale social 
mobilization is needed.    This requires a supra-tribal group conformity system, which is 
provided by Islam.  The political power of Islam in Afghanistan has historically been 
directed at external infidels, as when Ahmed Shah Durrani, the first ruler of united 
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Afghanistan, attacked the Hindu Marathes at Panipat in 1761, after considerable pressure 
from radical ‘ulamma preaching an offensive jihadism against the Indians.89   
Given the fierce egalitarian nature of the Pashtun tribes, Islam has typically been 
the only force that has been able to unite them for any common purpose.  The egalitarian 
nature of Pashtun society makes it difficult to form durable coalitions capable of 
accomplishing long-term goals.  Pashtunwali-based leadership, dependent on patrilineal 
identity structures, could not produce an acceptable leader that could hold together a 
Pashtun coalition.  Therefore, ―a leader who stood outside90 the tribal system, generally 
in the guise of a religious prophet, had the best prospect of gaining the cooperation of 
enough quarreling tribes to create a supra-tribal organization that could overcome its 
inherent divisions.‖91  This is usually accomplished by appealing to Islamic unity via 
jihad.  These jihads, capable of uniting fractious Pashtun tribes under a banner of 
―protecting the faith,‖ were often of short duration, and were common enough to earn the 
derisive shorthand name ―mad mullah movements‖ when the British dealt with them 
throughout the 19th century.92   The Mullah of Hadda, who lead the revolt against the 
British in the Swat Valley in 1897 which we mentioned in the Chapter I, emerged 
seemingly from nowhere and was able to establish a mythical sort of charismatic 
leadership through fantastic claims of turning bullets into water and the ability to feed 
multitudes from a small bag of rice.93 
This jihad phenomenon has evolved among the Pashtuns to allow the formation of 
alliances to counter a common threat and involves the voluntary, temporary shift in 
power from the traditional authority of the khan to a charismatic mullah ―[W]hile the 
movement is in the ascendant, the khan takes a back seat.‖ 94  Operations then commence 
under the leadership of the charismatic mullah.  When victory seems certain, internecine 
strife takes over and the khan reemerge to establish order.  Fighting stops and the status 
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quo resumes.  The khan then seeks to restore his traditional leadership role and direct 
dividing up the spoils of victory.  Thus, the jihad cycle can be seen as consisting of 
―forcing mechanisms:‖ a perceived injustice and the emergence of a charismatic mullah 
to lead a jihad; and ―braking mechanisms:‖ khan and other secular traditional leadership 
seeki to restore their influence and the status quo.    
While khan and mullah are usually portrayed in competition, there are 
components of the Islamic and Pashtunwali conformity structures that complement each 
other.  For example, Anderson describes the competing values of ‘aql and nafsh.  Derived 
from Qur‘anic interpretations, these concepts are common across the Muslim world and 
are a recognized means of conveying social expectations in Pashtuns: 
Pakhtun draw a series of open and flexible oppositions between politeness 
and roughness, maturity and immaturity, sociability and egocentricity as 
characteristics which are ultimately brought to rest on capacities of ‗aql 
and nafsh—roughly, sensibility and passion.95 
‘Aql represents the wisdom and sense of purpose that comes with age, while nafsh 
represents the vitality and physical capability of youth.  These two qualities are regarded 
as gifts of God to humans and give them the capacity for deliberate action which sets 
them apart from animals.  Every instance of behavior is conceived to be a combination of 
‘aql and nafsh capacities.96   
Secular Pashtunwali and Islam form two competing and cooperative structures 
that fill needs in the social groupings of the Pashtun.  Pashtunwali provides a normative 
structure that governs everyday life and relationships among the tribe, while Islam 
provides a framework for communication and a sense of place within the larger context 
of society, as well as a means of large-scale social mobilization through the jihad cycle.  
To prevent disintegration, egalitarian social groupings require a cohesive and universally 
enforced norm structure.  Brunton describes egalitarian societies as ―culturally unstable‖ 
and prone to cultural innovation that makes it difficult to sustain group norms.97  The 
Pashtun have developed a unique social structure that provides the necessary universal 
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norm structure at two levels:  a more localized Pashtunwali that governs the day-to-day 
and a more universal Islam that governs the worldview and leavens relationships.  
Identity and priority are able to shift between the two forms to allow flexibility to meet 
challenges. 
C. AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY 
In egalitarian Pashtun society, authority is a fluid concept, often shifting with 
circumstance.  A leader is only a leader in as far as his actions are consonant with the 
tribal norm structures discussed in the previous section.  Rather than the leadership 
influencing the institutions, these institutions exercise final authority over the individual 
and the leader, and as opposed to personal leadership, are ―the real instruments of social 
control.‖ 98   The primacy of the system over the individual fits squarely within the system 
of Pashtun egalitarianism, as the ability of individuals to meet a universal set of 
standards, be they pashtunwali or Islamic, becomes the prerequisite for authority. 
1. Egalitè and Hierarchy 
Patrilineal identity structures have made it very difficult for most Pashtuns to 
develop durable political institutions, as it creates social groupings of successively 
smaller size by generation.  Most concerted action among more than one tribe is for a 
very specific purpose and is of very limited duration.  After the threat is passed, tribal 
infighting resumes and the status quo returns.  So strong was this tendency for rivalry 
among cousins, it would be given its own Pashto word:  tarburwali.99  This conflict 
between egalitarianism and the hierarchies needed for supra-tribal politics would have 
important implications for the destinies of the different Pashtun tribes.  Pashtun 
egalitarianism does not grant authority by some idea of divine right; rather, it must be 
earned by consensus from below, making Pashtun leaders‘ power bases necessarily 
unstable and subject to shifting allegiances. 
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James Woodburn‘s work on egalitarian societies suggests that the egalitè of a 
society is a function of its economy.  Tribal economies that rely on long-term investment 
of resources, such as settled agriculture, will tend to develop more hierarchical and 
authoritative institutions as a means of providing protections for property.  This explains 
why the Durrani Pashtun, compared to their Ghilzai (and even more so their Karlanri) 
cousins, have developed political hierarchies while the latter have remained fiercely 
egalitarian.100  The Durrani, living primarily in the fertile plains between the Helmand 
River and Herat, developed settled agricultural economies that created these hierarchies, 
while their hill-cousins did not.  This expanded, supra-tribal political capability would 
help the Durrani dominate Afghan politics for almost 250 years.   
What the Durrani gained in political acumen, however, they lost in ferocity.  
Barfield notes that the settled Durrani ―were not as tough as the people from the margins; 
physically or mentally.‖101  As political hierarchies crystallized among the Durrani, 
partisan infighting and the segmentation of society into specialized groupings would 
neuter much of the Durrani military strength, causing them to rely on their ―meaner‖ 
cousins and the unpredictable transfer of power of the jihad cycle to achieve big things.  
The more egalitarian Ghilzai, while lacking the political institutions of power, would 
wield a formidable military force, and would often be called upon to support the state 
when it was in danger of invasion.102   
2. Tribal Authority   
Most authority at the tribal level is what Weber would characterize as traditional, 
dominated by certain families who control the limited resources in a nonmonetized 
economy.  Authority, or domination, as he terms it is ―the possibility of imposing one‘s 
own will upon the behavior of other persons.‖103  As noted in the previous section, 
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however, legitimacy of authority is vested in egalitarian Pashtun society from below on 
the basis of the ability of the prospective authoritarian to live up to the group norms of 
pashtunwali and Islam.   
When attempting to characterize social motivations, an important place to look is 
in the stories told in a society.  Edwards‘ story of Sultan Muhammed, recounted to him 
by a Pashtun from the Pech Valley, is illustrative.  When Sultan Muhammed is denied the 
chance to fulfill his badal (revenge) duties prescribed by pashtunwali after his mother 
kills his father‘s murderers, he punishes his mother‘s presumptuous initiative by blinding 
her. Sultan Muhammed rebukes his mother as he puts out her eyes: 
You have ruined my name and reputation in the tribe.  When you 
committed this act, you thought that you were taking revenge for my 
father or for your husband, but instead you have lost my position in the 
tribe.104   
This story is probably apocryphal, but it relates an important message about social 
expectations for legitimate authority in tribal society.  In a tribal context, this hyperbolic 
action is necessary because, as Edwards notes, ―the way [the khan] is remembered is not 
within his control, and given the ethos of tribal culture, this is exactly as it should be.‖105  
Reputation and legitimacy is not dynastically conferred and is something that requires 
constant vigilance in the fleeting nature of authority among egalitarian tribal members. 
The central authority figure in tribal settings is the khan.  Khan is a Turkic word 
that means ―lord‖ or ―chief‖ of a tribe.  In the context of egalitarian Pashtun society, it is 
more accurately translated as a person of influence and means within the tribal 
framework.106  Over the years, the Pashtuns have evolved a social structure that relies not 
on hierarchical leadership, but on informal patron-client relationships between khan and 
tribe member.  Rather than creating a monetized economy with his surplus of capital, the 
khan ―invest in relationships.  Hospitality, communal feasts, gift giving, and other forms 
of redistribution raise the status of the givers, and it is this social esteem or fame that is 
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more cherished than money.‖107  Of particular importance is the khan‘s ability to keep up 
the hujra (guest house), as a means of receiving visitors, solidifying clients and alliances, 
and controlling the discourse that enters the village from the outside world.  This ability 
―takes on a special significance as the symbol of the khan‘s identity and the way in which 
he wants to be viewed by his fellow tribesmen.‖108  
This ―social capital‖ created by the khan is much more important than monetary 
capital, and reinforces group loyalties by providing incentives to keep the loyalty of tribe 
members within the tribal qawm.  Khan provide the ―glue‖ that holds the tribe together by 
providing a social safety net, a channel through which the tribe communicates with the 
central government, and a general institution of patrimony that prevents the egalitarian 
tribes from disintegrating.109   Authority in rural Afghanistan is typically exercised 
through a jirga (council of venerable elders) dominated by influential khan and their 
clients.  These institutions developed independently of Islam and the shariat, often 
standing at odds with the latter.110 
3. Islamic Authority 
Islamic authority structures have played a significant role in the political 
development of Afghanistan.  These authority structures have traditionally taken three 
forms:  the charismatic mullah, the ‗ulama and the Sufi orders.   
The prototypical charismatic religious figure to unite the disparate tribes for 
Islamist rebellion may be the case of Sayyad Ahmed Barelvi (1786-1831) who, supported 
by the ‘ulama of northwest British India, bypassed the tribal leadership and appealed 
directly to the people to replace tribal law with the shariat, unite together and launch 
jihad against the British.111   The example of Barelvi, who had drawn his strength from 
the ‘ulama, inspired the creation of a jamaat (society) devoted to the purification of 
society and the political mobilization of the ‘ulama.  This movement, known later as the 
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Deobandi school, stressed the importance of a return to Islam and fused a highly 
orthodox view of Islam with the Sufi spiritualism common in Sunni practice in Central 
Asia.   
The Deobandi designated Hindu India as the dar ul-harb (abode of war) between 
believers and infidels and built an influential madrasa north of Delhi in 1857 in part to 
support the reformist ‘ulama in Afghanistan, who had no proper schooling facilities of 
their own.  A series of madrasas were also built along the Afghan-Indian border to 
facilitate the education of the Afghan clergy.  Most of Afghanistan‘s modern ‘ulama 
would be educated at Deoband or in one of their border madrasas.112  The ‘ulama have 
traditionally been most influential in the urban centers, where they were co-opted by the 
ruling elite to legitimate their rule over the independent-minded rural tribes.   
In contrast to the ‗ulama and charismatic mullahs, Sufism occupies a less 
ostentatious role in Islamic authority structures.  In fact, it is probably a misnomer to 
characterize the pir-murdi relationships between pir (holy men) and their murdi 
(disciples) as authoritarian.  These relationships are more affinity based and are not well 
understood from a social mobilization aspect.  What Sufism does is provide a framework 
of discourse that enables social motivation by innovative entrepreneurs.  The Sufi 
concept of barakat (holiness associated with people, places, or objects), probably inspired 
the charisma of the Mullah of Hadda in his 1897 uprising, as well as the Taliban‘s Mullah 
Omar, who seized a significant cache of mystical charismatic authority through his 
donning of the reputed ―Cloak of Mohammed‖ during a public rally.113   
D. GROUP MAINTENANCE 
Groups cannot survive without a system of group maintenance.  They need 
systematic ways to continually teach and reteach the consensual norms of the group 
through various methods.  Aside from family-based norm transmission, peer level 
maintenance techniques are as important, because they allow group norms to be 
transmitted and prevent the group from degenerating by generation to strictly single-
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family based units.  In Pashtun society, this maintenance is done in several ways:  
through building and maintaining patronage networks, storytelling, and prose and poetry.  
These artifacts create a ―narrative‖ or common theme that runs through society that helps 
members verify their in-group participation and gives a framework through which they 
can process new information and make decisions. 
1. Patronage 
Client patronage by power brokers is probably the most important means of 
identity group maintenance.  In Afghanistan, the social prestige of a khan or a mullah is 
dependent upon what patronage he can provide to his clients.  In the case of the khan, 
access and control over resources allows him to provide these benefits to his 
―constituents‖ as a means of social security, and establishes him as a legitimate 
interlocutor between the individual and the government.  Isby notes: 
No single concept is more important to Afghanistan‘s internal conflicts 
than that of patron-client relationships and the patronage networks these 
create… The importance of patronage relations extends to the battle of 
ideas in Afghanistan.  Afghans are exposed to many different and often 
competing sources of news, but there is a tendency to follow the views of 
the provider of patronage or other Afghans that they desire to emulate.114 
Patronage creates confidence in the social order in Pashtun society.  While many urban 
Afghans view patronage as a ―feudal‖ system, the relationships are much more nuanced 
than this.   Roy contends that power in tribal Pashtun society lies less in specific people 
than in ―an elusive network‖ of patronage ―which needs constant maintenance and 
reconstruction.‖  Rather than a feudal entity, dependent upon ―oaths of allegiance,‖ 
Pashtun patronage networks and the power the khan derive from them are based on a 
delicate consensus of the qawm.115 
2. Discourse and Storytelling 
Stories are ―implicit communication‖ that convey values indirectly.  The story 
medium is superior to direct communication because stories are easier to remember and 
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serve to reinforce beliefs in an organization.  They are easier to understand and people 
tend to pay attention to them, allowing them to make sense of their world through 
analogy with the tenets of the story.116  In Pashtun society, stories provide a template for 
other group members and show idealized accounts of ―men of quality‖ who are ―tested 
and, by dint of their single-mindedness, their courage, and their capacity, demonstrate the 
qualities of person and action by which greatness is achieved.‖117   In other words, stories 
communicate societal expectations through examples of the ―prototypical Pashtun‖ such 
as Edwards‘ account of Sultan Mohammed of the Pech Valley discussed previously. 
The societal ideal is represented often in stories in many cultures, and 
Afghanistan is no exception.  Stories and myths are an important part of the maintenance 
of group integrity.  They typically refer to a standard set of values that was practiced in 
antiquity and encourage the continuation of those values.118  This serves as a means of 
preserving the character of the group and prevents disintegration.   
3. Literature and Poetry 
Poems and lyrical media are a preferred means of transmitting societal norms 
from teacher to learner.  Dupree describes Afghans as having a ―literate culture [in a] 
non-literate society.‖119  The lack of widespread literate material, particularly in rural 
Pashtun areas, makes the transmission of group norms through memorable lyrical media 
particularly important.   This is true of love, honor and religion (particularly Sufism) as 
poems are used as means of transmitting ideals.120   
Johnson and Waheed provide an important analysis of the use of lyrical media as 
a means of promoting group identity with their investigation of Taliban taranas (chants).  
A popular Taliban tarana (chant) rails against the foreigners‘ presence in Afghanistan: 
Oh Afghan, the Foreigners are present in your country 
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They are your yesterdays’ enemies whom your ancestors defeated, and  
Then they ran away.  Today they are the rulers who dominate your soil. 
Those people are present who pretend themselves to be your friends but 
They are your previous enemies. 121 
This verse shows an attempt by the Taliban propagandists to elicit sympathy for the 
Taliban cause by showing that the values of the jihad are consistent with the ―Social 
Man‖ values of the broader population.  This is accomplished by appealing to analogy 
with past actions against the ―Foreigners‖ (―whom your ancestors defeated‖), and a sense 
of shame or disappointment with the current order and a suggested inability by Afghans 
to defend their namus from foreign domination (―Today, they are the rulers who 
dominate your soil‖).  The chant also attempts to show that a core Afghan value of 
straightforward behavior and the ―Foreigners‖ values are at odds (―Those people are 
present who pretend themselves to be your friends but they are your previous 
enemies.”)122 
By conveying this message through a traditional lyrical medium, the Taliban 
propagandists access several facets of their audience‘s decision process.  They access 
―Social Man‖ through the appeal to common values and norms.  They also increase the 
salience of their message by using the musical medium, which has been shown by 
research to significantly increase memory retention of the wording and message 
contained in the song.123  Taliban use of songs and chants keeps their threat and their 
appeal in people‘s memory longer, meaning they are more likely to take their message 
into consideration when making choices. 
4. Narrative 
The common narrative among Pashtuns is that their people are descended from 
Qais, a contemporary of the Prophet Mohammed.  Qais supposedly returned to his native 
Afghanistan after his service with the Prophet was completed and converted many 
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multitudes, making Qais and his Pashtun descendants among the first defenders of the 
faith, with particular importance due to its proximity to the infidel frontier with India.  
The veracity of this narrative has been challenged, with some scholars suggesting that 
most Pashtuns came rather late into the Islamic fold, but what is important about a 
narrative is less its truth than its existence.124 
Narrative is an important vehicle for the interpretation of information in social 
society. Akerlof indicates that people will tend to reject information that is not consistent 
with previously held views, or in other words, if this information is not consistent with 
their narrative.125  By prioritizing and weighting information that is consistent with their 
beliefs, people reinforce their group membership and ensure their behavior is consistent 
with the established group norms.   
People have a need to ―create narrative descriptions for ourselves and for others 
about our own past actions, and we develop storied accounts that give sense to the 
behavior of others.‖126  As pointed out above, the Taliban have a sophisticated grasp of 
the narrative form, which is a function of their existence within the narrative frame of 
their effort.  By comparison, Western attempts at narrative often boil down to messaging, 
typified by the ―leaflet bombs‖ that are popular in psychological operations.  It is 
important to distinguish the terms ―narrative‖ and ―messaging.‖  Simply put, Afghan 
―narratives‖ are a system of cognitive standards that allow ―messages‖ to be interpreted.  
Ruston notes: 
Part of the reason the extremist narratives are more successful than 
American narratives is that the American messages are often not narratives 
at all. ―The Taliban have archaic values‖ (to paraphrase Ashley Bommer, 
advisor to Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke) is not a narrative. It is an 
opinion, forged within a particular worldview, a worldview itself shaped 
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by certain narratives that valorize equality, a free market regulated by law 
rather than pecuniary circumvention, the role of women as leaders in 
society, etc.127 
In order to effectively communicate with an Afghan audience, messages must be crafted 
in a way that resonates in the target audience‘s own narrative, and is consistent with the 
transmission schemes identified above.  
In contrast to Western attempts at narrative resonance, three Taliban themes found 
in their prose and lyrical propaganda are consistent with existing narratives and is based 
on social principles which we identified in Chapter II, particularly with Sherif‘s 
analysis128 of group dynamics:   
 1.  Othering:   creating a distinction and placing social distance between the 
audience (Muslim) and the out-group (Non-Muslim).   
2.  Appeal to positive in-group attributes and traditional values by reminding of 
ancestor‘s accomplishments.   
3.  Cultural paranoia. For example an accusation of the West‘s plan to teach 
Christianity to Afghan children creates a feeling of ―group under siege‖ leading to more 
conservative (in-group) choices.129 
With these messaging strategies, the Taliban are trying to create social 
identification with their cause.  This is why you don‘t see Taliban ―advertising‖ talking 
about the benefits of their governance, even though it is in many cases technically 
superior to the governance provided by the central government.  They want people to 
identify with them on an ideological and social level.  If this is achieved, the target 
audience becomes psychologically invested in the Taliban message, and cognitive 
dissonance will create a motivation to discard any evidence (and any attempts by the 
government of Afghanistan) that is contrary to these narrative-conforming beliefs.  
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D. “SOCIAL MAN” AND THE TALIBAN 
1.  Decline of Secular Authority 
The rural Afghan economy is characterized by patron-client relationships in 
which khan dispense patronage to their clients.  As Barfield notes, khan invest surplus 
capital in social relationships rather than a monetized economy as a means of getting and 
maintaining influence.  As participants in the market economy between rural village and 
towns, khan have traditionally formed an important link between urban and rural 
populations as well as between the central government and the diffuse authority 
structures of the egalitarian Pashtun tribes.130 
Economic changes in Afghanistan have created incentives for a shift in identity 
patterns. In the late 1960s, Anderson described the introduction of tractors to the highly 
egalitarian social structure of Ghilzai Pashtun tribes in eastern Afghanistan.  These 
heavily subsidized tractor grants were part of an intensive agricultural modernization 
effort in the Pashtun areas that also served as a means to increase dependency of the 
Ghilzai power brokers on state largesse.  As this new technology spread into Ghilzai 
areas, certain ―new‖ khan who were better connected and friendlier to the institutions of 
government received preferential treatment, despite not having a significant client base.  
The ―new khan‖ proceeded to charge fees for tilling, an innovative practice in a 
nonmonetized subsistence economy.  The wholesale transfer of economic power as a 
result of tractor possession led to a loss of prestige for traditional khan and an overall 
degradation of the traditional authority structure that had been in place for centuries.131 
The onset of the Soviet-Afghan War in 1979 served the khan no better.  The 
massive devastation and almost total economic disruption during the war caused the khan 
to be completely sidelined in the nontribal areas.  In the tribal areas, the physical 
devastation to fruit orchards and irrigation systems as a result of Soviet COIN efforts 
caused the economic power base of the khan to nearly disappear in the rural areas as well.  
Roy notes that the khan also suffered politically due to their traditional links to the central 
government ―at a time when the state has suffered overwhelming rejection.‖  Many khan, 
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unable to rely on their traditional client power bases, chose exile over poverty or 
persecution at the hands of their ascendant rivals, the mullahs. 132 
The importance of the fall of the khan cannot be overstated.  As part of a 
traditional, secular authority structure, the khan provided an important negative feedback 
mechanism to the jihad cycle discussed earlier.  The khan, by nature, is unsuited for 
participating in a unified, supra-tribal party structure, such as the mujahideen resistance, 
since his traditional role has been to break up the unity of the jihad cycle.  From a 
behavior economics standpoint, the presence of the khan traditional authority and its 
position that was traditionally hostile to the peer-driven, charismatic impetus of the jihad 
function served to limit levels of conformity to the ―jihad norm‖ in favor of the 
―pashtunwali norm‖ and served as a stabilizer to society.133   
This monetization of an economy that was previously dependent on the flow of 
social capital from khan to patron inevitably led to changes in identification patterns, as 
traditional tribal identification became less profitable to certain segments of society, 
leading to a shift from the ―Social Man‖ decision model toward the ―Economic Man‖ 
model.  This shift has enormous implications, as social stability in tribal areas is heavily 
dependent upon personal relationships and networks.  
2. The Rise of the „Ulamma 
As secular identification and authority structures were being neutered by a lack of 
resources stemming from the Soviet-Afghan War, Islamic identity and authority 
structures were ascendant.  Among Pashtuns in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA), the Pakistani government pursued an active policy of empowering Islamist 
segments of Pashtun society as a means of neutering the tribal threat of the Pashtuns in 
these difficult to govern areas, and also as a means of projecting power into Afghanistan 
both before and during the War.134 
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A favorite form of foreign policy leverage employed by Afghan kings was the 
―Pashtunistan Card;‖ the threat of a united Pashtun homeland as a means of undermining 
Pakistan.  Despite the fact that a united Pashtunistan might mean the disintegration of 
Afghanistan itself, it served Afghan purposes effectively enough to provoke Pakistani 
insecurity, as the latter felt much threatened by their Indian neighbors and Baluch 
separatists in their southwestern provinces.  From the mid-twentieth century, Pakistan 
had responded to Afghan foreign policy provocations by seeking ―strategic depth‖ 
through influence over the some 12 million Pashtuns living in the western provinces (and 
particularly in the FATA).  Unable to strike a deal with tribal leaders, influence would be 
accomplished through undermining the tribes‘ traditional authority structures by actively 
subsidizing the mullahs over the khans.135   
Many early Taliban were drawn from madrasas, particularly ones that had been 
operating under Pakistani auspices along the border in the FATA.  These madrasas had 
been subsidized and built in the 1970s as a way to empower destabilizing forces in 
Afghanistan in order to counter the threat of Pashtun nationalism among the very large 
Pashtun population that straddled the border between the two countries.  Through the 
madrasa system and the active subsidization of the Islam identity at the expense of the 
Pashtun identity, Pakistan had created a well-resourced patronage network similar to the 
one that existed among the khan, but with vastly greater resources and centrally 
controlled.  This was a unique development, as Sufi and religious networks traditionally 
relied on ideological ―buy-in‖ and voluntary resourcing from khan-based identity 
structures.  This framework, as we discussed earlier, allowed the Pashtun identity to act 
as a brake against any overreach by the Islam identity movement.  With the collapse of 
khan based authority, this braking mechanism no longer existed, and the only viable 
social network capable of meeting Pashtun needs sprang from the Islamic identity model. 
These changes in society were reflected in the discourse of the war, as Edwards 
points out: 
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Poetry from the first period of the war tended to be hortatory, centering 
around symbols of honor, descent, and heroic action. By the early 1980s, 
however, the poetry had changed, most obviously in the new centrality of 
Islamic symbols and the absence of honor-based imagery.136 
The traditional authority and identity structures had been decimated, replaced by 
charismatic authority of the mullahs, best personified by the eventual emergence of the 
Taliban in the aftermath of the Soviet-Afghan War.   
Additionally, the technocratic fighting against the Soviets did not afford the same 
social ―honor‖ opportunities as traditional tribal warfare, with no Pashtun-identity badal 
benefits to defend.137  On the other hand, the social benefits of associating with the 
Islamist identity structures were myriad.  The Islamists were better resourced through 
their Pakistani patrons.  This quickly became apparent with the shift in operational format 
of the mujahideen fighting, moving from a Pashtunwali model of combat to a jihad 
model.  During the early stages of the war, operational decisions were made along a tribal 
combat model, empowering decisions through the tribal lashkar (army) system, reflecting 
the nonhierarchical and segmentary structure of Pashtun society. Traditional, khan-based 
authority was not organized to cope with a well-organized external enemy.  Over time, 
however, the better-organized and resourced Islamist groups under Pakistani patronage 
would eclipse the traditionally organized Pashtunwali-style resistance.138   
The new way of war also brought changes to the discourse of Islamic resistance.  
Just as technocratic combat diminished the resonance of tribal valor themes, the 
traditional narrative of Islamic resistance changed.  Edwards notes:  
References to heroic combat were no longer appropriate or resonant in this 
setting. Islam helped to fill this void, but the Islam that came to the fore 
was not that of charismatic saints who turned enemy bullets to water as in 
an earlier era in Swat. Miracles and saints were no more plausible or 
relevant in the context of modern warfare than heroic ancestors. What did 
resonate was the promise of immortality and eternal paradise.139 
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The Soviet-Afghan War created a shift from the diffuse authority structure of the 
Pashtun tribes to a more centralized one.  Central authority over the Pashtun had been a 
dream of Kabul for generations, and it is ironic that it would eventually manifest under an 
Islamist banner headquartered out of Quetta.  
3. Dismantling the Family Unit 
The Soviet-Afghan War also created one of the largest refugee migrations in 
history, as millions of Afghans, mostly Pashtun sought to escape the indiscriminate 
violence of the Soviet rural counterinsurgency campaign.  Many of these refugees settled 
in refugee camps set up in the Pashtun areas of the Northwest Frontier Provinces (NWFP) 
of Pakistan.  With limited educational opportunities, the youth who have grown up in 
these camps have often been educated in one of the thousands of militant Pakistani-
subsidized madrasas in the NFWP that we discussed earlier.140   
Many of these refugee camp children had lost at least one parent to violence.  In 
2005, 61% of reported Afghan refugees were under 17 years old, with almost a third 
(28%) under 5 years old.141  This social upheaval, particularly among the developing 
social identities of Afghan refugee children, provides an environment that can lead to 
instances of Reactive Attachment Disorder.  Studies among institutionalized children in 
Romania, who experienced little parental-figure nurturing during their formative years, 
showed an marked inclination (45%) toward socially uninhibited behavior.142  Interviews 
conducted by the author confirmed that Reactive Attachment Disorder can lead to 
identity associations that favor ideologically-driven charismatic authority over a more 
reserved form of traditional identity associations.143 
Family upheaval, coupled with the overall disintegration of the traditional tribal 
identity structures has created a generation of poorly-socialized Pashtun inhabiting the 
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border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The lack of a ―sense of place‖ and 
belonging among these Pashtun youth can create a great deal of psychological 
discomfort.  Edwards‘ observations of Pashtuns separated from their traditional social 
orders showed a strong tendency to revert to overly conservative behaviors, typically 
centered around Islamic identity, in their interactions with others, as people seek to 
reinforce social ties and establish their place in new social orders.144  
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IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis, we have advocated a reconsideration of classical decision theory in 
counterinsurgency thinking.  Current counterinsurgency doctrine is based on a strictly 
economic interpretation of the decision models in the subject population.  The ―Economic 
Man‖ approach, while effective in certain populations that have urbanized, hierarchical 
and monetized economies and social structures, does not take into account the strong 
social interventions that characterize decision models in tribal and nonmonetized 
economies, such as the Pashtun case that we have presented in this thesis.  Classical 
counterinsurgency theorists such as Sir Robert Thompson have recognized that a simple 
security-for-loyalty bargain between the government and the subject population is not 
enough for success:  
Security by itself is not enough to make the peasant willingly choose to 
support the government.  Without it he cannot, even with it he still may 
not.  The next step, therefore, is to influence his choice, which must still 
remain a free choice.  He can only be made to choose freely to support the 
government if the government can show him that what it has to offer is 
something better than the insurgent can offer him.  You must improve his 
lot not only economically, but also socially, politically… and culturally.145 
Until relatively recently, we have understood little about how social factors affect 
economic thinking when making important decisions.  Behavioral economic theory, 
which has incorporated many of the advances in social psychology, anthropology and 
game theory, may hold the keys to understanding decision making in populations like the 
Pashtun. 
In this thesis, we have shown that Pashtun behavior is consistent with the 
behavior models described in the growing field of behavior economics.  Strong social 
interventions exist in the Pashtun behavior model that are tied to culture and the social 
institutions that have evolved over the centuries.  The group dynamics of the Pashtun 
show similar characteristics to the group norms identified by Sherif in his work on groups 
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and conflict and the egalitarian nature of Pashtun society has been described in similar 
terms by anthropologists such as Woodburn and Brunton.146 
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS 
When designing counterinsurgency campaigns, the COIN government must find 
ways to significantly lower the economic, political and social costs of supporting the 
government over the insurgent.  A primary objective of the COIN practitioner is to 
separate the insurgent from the population, both physically and mentally.  Traditional 
COIN doctrine places emphasis on the physical separation of the insurgent from the 
population.  In this thesis, we have advocated a scientific basis for the mental separation 
of the population from the insurgent, using an understanding of the cultural and social 
motivations that are part of the decision models of all human beings.   
Without a systematic way to understand human motivation, the practice of 
counterinsurgency will continue to be based on previous experience and the application 
of previous ―best practices‖ by way of analogy.  Without understanding why some 
practices worked in certain contexts, operations risk considerable time lost to ―learning 
curves‖ in new cultural contexts.  Trying to apply COIN practices that worked in a 
hierarchical, urban social setting could prove tragically misguided when applied to an 
egalitarian, rural tribal setting.    
In the first chapter, we established ―decision‖ as the center of gravity in COIN 
operations.  Since economics is the science of decision, it is logical that if COIN 
practitioners understand a bit about the science of decision, they may be able to make 
better strategies for convincing, cajoling and threatening their way to the positive 
decision outcome desired.  Influencing outcomes through the selective application of 
information is the province of Information Operations (IO). 
The joint U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 
mentions the importance of effective Information Operations (IO), but the examples 
given are primarily concerned with ―getting the word out‖ about the host nation narrative 
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and countering insurgent propaganda.  In fact, the field manual‘s section on IO is only a 
few pages long.  Similarly, the Army IO Field Manual provides a good overview of IO 
principles, but essentially treats IO as a supporting component of kinetic military 
operations.   
While supporting combat operations is an important part of IO, this approach does 
not address the real problem of influencing and persuading the population.  Current 
attempts at crafting COIN narratives for consumption by the population usually take the 
form of unsophisticated ―information bombs‖ of repeated messages and leaflets that hold 
little relevance in the context of a rural and tribal insurgency. Many efforts to create an 
effective information campaign have been ―downright silly and an embarrassment‖ in the 
words of one analyst.147 
An understanding of human decision models will allow information operators to 
craft more sophisticated messaging strategies that are more likely to resonate in the target 
audience.  By moving from information strategies that focus on the purely economic 
benefits of supporting the government to strategies that tap the population‘s deeply held 
beliefs, culture and social imperatives, information strategies are more likely to produce 
positive outcomes for the COIN force.  Additionally, by leveraging the appropriate 
transmission media that are effective in different societies, such as poetry, chant and song 
in the Pashtun case, message strategies are more likely to influence decision outcomes in 
the target population. 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Traditional COIN theory assumes what is known in economics literature as 
―expected utility theory.‖  In this model, people make decisions involving risk by 
weighing their options based on maximizing expected utility.  Research has shown that 
this model falls short in several instances, particularly when social factors and 
perceptions distort the value placed on various options.   
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A great deal of research has been conducted studying the social interventions that 
cause people to deviate from expected utility theory when making decisions.  Much of 
this research has been conducted on Western experimental subjects, although some work, 
most notably Henrich et al. has attempted to apply the findings of behavioral economics 
across cultures.148  What is needed is more comparative economic research among 
nonurbanized and nonmonetized populations, in order to provide more detail on the 
extent to which social interventions cause deviation from expected utility in different 
cultural environments.   
COIN requires a sophisticated understanding of human beings, particularly an 
understanding of how they will make decisions in different environments.  For a long 
time, however, COIN theory has relied upon a corpus of knowledge that is based on a 
Western interpretation of motivation, springing as it did from an Enlightenment era of 
understanding of economic decision-making.  This corpus grew up in an environment of 
urbanized, monetized industry, and made assumptions on human behavior that were 
consistent with this worldview.  With a homogeneous view of human interpretation and 
meaning, it was assumed that all human motivation sprang from the same cognitive 
processes, and views to the contrary were dismissed as Orientalism, particularly as a 
backlash against Western-centric anthropology in the late 19th century.  This view is in 
need of reassessment, as Polkinghorne states succinctly:  ―the study of human beings by 
the human sciences needs to focus on the realm of meaning in general, and on narrative 
meaning in particular.‖149  An understanding that meaning and narratives are relative 
terms is a good place to start. 
Successful COIN is predicated upon the ability to craft relevant narratives that 
resonate with the population and to predict the behavior that results from the activities of 
the COIN force.  To do this reliably, we need economic tools that are informed by 
anthropological and ethnographic experience to devise effective information strategies. 
Game theorists and classical economists contend that everyone has an economic 
price that will ensure a positive outcome for a COIN force, but it is dangerous to assume 
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that price involves a road, a school, a goat or a well.  The price may be based entirely on 
identity, or the context in which the choice is made, or a combination of all three decision 
personalities which we have presented in this thesis:  economic, social and context.  
COIN practitioners must unlock these nuances and learn to make the choice to support 
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